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Abstract 
 
  The Department of Defense (DoD) has budgeted over $134.5 billion for Fiscal 
Year 2004 for Acquisition, yet little is written about the personnel responsible for 
managing and evaluating Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP), that is those 
who perform Acquisition Oversight.  The Acquisition Oversight process has not been 
studied in a disciplined manner. 
  Congress, past Administrations, and the DoD Inspector General have 
commissioned several studies on the Acquisition Oversight Process.  Recommendations 
were considered and implemented such that the process evolved to where it stands today.  
Over 40 years separate the first iteration with the latest version.  Commission reports, 
countless studies, and historians agree on the need for oversight in military acquisitions; 
they agree that the system takes too much money, takes too long, and does not perform as 
well as most would wish; yet they disagree on who should perform oversight. 
  This thesis reviewed relevant literature to model historical oversight hierarchies.  
Then expert opinions were gathered from the studies mentioned above, on how well the 
oversight process modeled preformed.  As expected, the oversight process has improved 
over time but further improvements are currently being sought.  Those seeking 
improvement would do well to study past processes and learn from their mistakes. 
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ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF MAJOR DEFENSE  
 
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS – A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 
 
Background 
 
 
On 11 September 2001 America awoke to the threat of terror when Al Queda 
forces crashed commercial airplanes into the World Trade Center in New York and the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C.  President George W. Bush sent troops into Afghanistan 
and later into Iraq to pursue those responsible.  America’s Armed Forces accomplished 
this with the use of highly skilled personnel and technologically advanced equipment.  
The technology employed by America’s Armed Forces and the training on said systems 
are products of the Defense Acquisition System.  Keeping the technological edge over 
America’s enemies requires a Defense Acquisition System that is flexible, affordable, 
and manageable.   
 Evaluating the adequacy of the Defense Acquisition System starts by 
understanding the parts of this institution and defining terms.  Defense includes the 
uniformed and civilian military and the officials appointed over them.  The Acquisition 
System is the management process by which research, development, and procurement of 
an item occurs.  The regulation, Department of Defense (DoD) 5000 The Defense 
-1- 
Acquisition System, governs this system.  As defined by the May 2003 issue of the DoD 
5000 series “Defense Acquisition System is the management process by which the 
Department of Defense provides effective, affordable, and timely systems to the users” 
(DoD 2003).  The users are the Combatant and Unified Commands. 
 The systems that qualify for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) status 
are multibillion dollar items such as tanks, planes, carriers and missiles.  An MDAP as 
described by the DoD 5000 series is “a directed, funded effort that provides a new, 
improved, or continuing material, weapon, or information system or service capability in 
response to an approved need” (DoD 2003).  The United States Code 10 chapter 144 
defines a MDAP as: 
a Department of Defense Acquisition Program that is not a highly sensitive 
classified program (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) and – 1) that is 
designated by the secretary of defense as a major defense acquisition program; or 
2) that is estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total 
expenditure for research, development, test, and evaluation of more than 
$300,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) or an eventual total 
expenditure for procurement of more than $1,800,000,000 (based on fiscal year 
1990 constant dollars. (10 USC 2430) 
 
 The Secretary of Defense is required by law to ensure all MDAPs are being 
reviewed properly.  Therefore several layers of Acquisition Executives are employed to 
review a program at key decision points known as milestones or “the point at which a 
recommendation is made and approval sought regarding starting or continuing an 
acquisition program” (DoD 2003).  The management review by acquisition executives 
placed within the Department of Defense prior to a milestone decision will henceforth be 
called oversight.   
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 Programs are separated into Acquisition Categories (ACAT).  MDAPs are 
designated as ACAT I, a category defined by the DoD 5000 series as:  
An Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program that is estimated to require an 
eventual total expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation of more 
than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant dollars or, for procurement, of 
more than $2.190 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars, or a program that is 
designated as an MDAP because of special interest by the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). (DoD 2003) 
 
The MDAPs that receive the oversight from officials placed in the highest ranks of the 
Defense Department are those that fall into ACAT ID.  Conversely, those falling into 
ACAT IC are MDAPs delegated down to the Services for milestone reviews (DoD 2003).   
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 Milestone reviews occur during the system’s acquisition life; depicted in figure 
one as triangles.  A MDAP is initiated at milestone B (see Figure 1).  Prior to milestone B 
several iterative studies are performed on the product so the program baseline can be 
established.  With this acquisition program baseline and 19 other supportive documents 
required by statute or regulations, a series of officials evaluate the product’s readiness to 
become an MDAP.  For more on the documentation required for a milestone review, see 
DoD 5000, Table E3 (DoD 2003: 18-22).  
Figure 1. The Defense Acquisition Management Framework. (DoD 2003) 
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 Quantitative Studies.   
 Ideally the comparison of oversight processes would be done quantitatively.  That 
is evaluating Acquisition Oversight process by its burden on the federal budget and 
personnel, and its cost in time.  Unfortunately such information is not readily available.  
The Selective Acquisition Reports mandated by Congress for all MDAPs does not 
contain the costs of performing the oversight over each MDAP.  The Federal budget does 
not record the fiscal costs of oversight activities.  Personnel Commands do not have a 
specialty code to record the personnel costs of oversight activities.  The time to perform 
one milestone review is not uniformly recorded by meeting minutes, travel logs, or any 
readily available report. 
 The fiscal cost of acquisition oversight process has been studied by several 
organizations.   
The Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology and Government, using an 
indirect measure of cost of the DoD regulatory system, calculated that the 
overhead, or management and control costs, associated with the DoD acquisition 
process were about forty percent of the DoD acquisition budget…This figure 
includes both the Government’s internal costs, and the costs borne by DoD 
contractors and ultimately reimbursed by the Government (Perry 1994:5).   
 
RAND took into consideration the Carnegie study as well as many others then made a 
more conservative estimate.  RAND estimates that the cost of the oversight process is 
between five and ten percent of the Defense Acquisition Budget (Lorell 1990:12).   
 To get an idea of the magnitude of this cost see figure 2.  To fund the armed 
forces ability to defend America, to go to war, and to perform military duties, President 
Bush requested from Congress $379.9 billion for fiscal year 2004 (DoD Budget 2003:1).  
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As part of his request, $134.5 billion of the $379.9 billion or 35 percent is slated to fund 
Defense Acquisition Programs (DoD Budget 2003:5).  As stated previously Acquisition 
Oversight costs is not a line item in the federal budget but if one puts a wedge in for this 
expense it would be between $6.7 and $53.6 billion in FY 2004 dollars (using RAND 5% 
estimates as low and Carnegie 40% estimates for the high).  Note that these costs include 
the contractors mark-up for working with the government and complying with the 
government’s demand for reports.  Not included in these figures are government costs 
related to personnel, the maintenance of facilities, or a number of overhead costs such as 
supplies; these items are included in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget line.  
Therefore a more precise estimate of the cost of oversight would include a margin for 
these items included in the O&M budget line.   
Acquisition 
Oversight 
$6.7B
 2%
Department of 
Defense 
$245.4B
64%
Defense 
Acquisition 
$127.8B
 34%
 
Figure 2 Budget Pie Chart (DoD Budget 2003) 
 Unlike the RAND study or the Carnegie study, The Process Action Team, as 
commissioned by President Clinton in 1994, estimated the average cost for one formal 
review of one MDAP.  The PAT found that it costs $10-$12 million in Fiscal Year 1993 
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dollars.  The PAT estimated that over the MDAP’s lifetime, $40 million or more could be 
spent on acquisition oversight alone (PAT 1994:8).  It is not certain whether the PAT 
included a margin for the O&M expenses mentioned earlier.   
 The time to perform oversight has only just been studied by the 1994 PAT.  The 
PAT commissioned the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) to study the actual average 
time to perform a milestone review for one MDAP.  The DoD 5000 series estimates the 
average time to perform one review is 180 days.  The IDA studied 150 programs across 
Services, system type, and program phase.  The IDA places the average time for 
oversight at milestone B (Figure 1) as 10 weeks beyond the 180 days or close to 9 months 
total (Bicksler 1991:50).   
 Personnel costs have not been studied judiciously.  When challenged to estimate 
the number of personnel involved with the oversight process, the PAT stated we “could 
not even grossly estimate the number” (PAT 1994:8).  Not all the costs are captured by 
the 1994 PAT study, neither has there been studies to back up the PAT findings, nor are 
there government reports currently collecting cost information.  An improved data 
collection method would be needed to better track the quantitative costs of oversight.  
 Qualitative Studies.   
 In addressing the question on who should perform oversight, Congress, past 
Administrations, and the DoD Inspector General have commissioned several studies on 
the Acquisition Process (See table 1).  Recommendations were considered and 
implemented such that the process evolved to where it stands today.  Over 40 years 
separate the first iteration of the DoD Acquisition Process with the latest version.  
Reports done by major commission on Defense Acquisition Process, countless studies, 
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and historians agree on the need for oversight in military acquisitions; they agree that the 
system takes too much money, takes too long, and does not perform as well as most 
would wish; they disagree on who should perform oversight (Defense Policy 1988, 
McNaugher 1989, and GAO 1997).  The commission reports listed in Table 1 has all 
commented on the quality of DoD management, often in regards to Acquisition.  The 
reports embody the expert opinions on past oversight hierarchies and the oversight ability 
to perform.   
Table 1. Major Commissions on Defense Acquisition Process
Date Major Commission 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1949 First Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch  
1953 Rockefeller Committee 
1955 Second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive  
            Branch 
1970 Fitzhugh Commission / Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 
1972 Commission on Government Procurement 
1983 Grace Commission / President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls 
1986 Packard Commission/ President’s Blue Ribbon Defense Commission 
1994 Process Action Team on Oversight and Review 
 
 
Problem Statement 
 
 
 The current Acquisition Oversight process has not been studied in a discipline 
manner to understand how it is performing given the evolution of the past 40 years.  
Studies centered on the Acquisition Process have primarily focused on government-to-
contractor relations or on Congress’ relationship with the DoD (Farrell 1997, Fox 1994, 
GAO 1997, and Harman 2003).  The oversight process within the DoD has been treated 
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as a “black box” where MDAPs disappear into or emerge as a new product in the hands 
of the Warfighters.  The first step to understanding the process is to identify the players, 
their mission, and their capabilities and how they relate to each other.  This thesis 
identifies the organizations that perform formal milestone reviews on MDAP and how 
they have evolved to their current state then evaluated performance over the years.  Since 
hard data on costs is not available a qualitative analysis was done in lieu of a quantitative 
comparison. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
 
 This thesis has three research objectives. 
 
1) Define, document, and utilize available literature relevant to Acquisition 
Oversight procedures, to identify the organizations involved with the process 
as it evolved to its form today. 
 
2) Build models of the Acquisition Oversight Process, emphasis on the chain of 
command construct, as it existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and the 
present construct. 
 
3) Evaluate each on its ability to accomplish seven goals derived from Clinton’s 
1994 Process Action Team on Acquisition Oversight report, using past 
research relevant to Acquisition Oversight procedures. 
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Methodology 
 
 
 First the organizations were identified.  Then models were developed from 
organization charts, historically documented relationships, and statutory relationships 
recorded in Title 10.  The Models have the following key (see Figure 1).   
Formal Relationship 
Oversight Units 
Informal Relationship  
Independent Units Advisor Relationship
Figure 3.  Model Key 
 
Expert opinions regarding the oversight process in relation to seven criteria was extracted 
from commission reports.  If there were no comments found in the commission reports 
stating differently the oversight process met each criterion.   
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 This thesis is limited to the DoD Acquisition Oversight Process as it historically 
existed between the Air Force and the Secretary of Defense, or those serving similar 
positions.  As such, the following limits were placed on the thesis. 
1) Both the requirements generation system and the budget process are being 
transformed; each is not as well documented as the Acquisition process or as 
thoroughly studied.  Relationships between the budget process, requirements 
generation process and the Acquisition process are being redefined.  
Therefore organizations generating the requirements entering the acquisition 
process and organizations providing the budget and performing the planning, 
programming, budgeting activities are not covered.   
 
2) The decision to start an acquisition program requires the most intense form of 
acquisition oversight.  Therefore this thesis concentrates on the oversight 
process at this decision point (currently Milestone B).   
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3) The Air Force is the service of interest; therefore the period being covered 
starts with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation 
of the Air Force, and concludes in 2003 with the approval of the latest version 
of the DoD 5000 series.   
 
 
 
Assumptions 
 
 
 The Defense Acquisition System works with a multitude of organizations outside 
the system; such interfaces can skew the effectiveness of the oversight performed.  
Therefore the following assumptions have been employed for this research effort. 
1) The Defense Acquisition System processes MDAP that face a stable budget 
and stable requirements; it is understood that such MDAPs are rare. 
 
2) Studies performed on acquisition and its oversight process evaluate the 
process as depicted in the DoD 5000 series, Air Force regulations, and 
statutory laws. 
 
3) The majority of MDAPs went through the entire process as depicted in the 
DoD 5000 series, Air Force regulations, and statutory laws. 
 
4) External agencies to the process do not adversely affect measures of 
performance. 
 
 
 
Thesis Overview 
 
 
 Chapter Two focuses on entities responsible for the Acquisition Process as found 
in historical literature.  Discussion focuses on the evolution of the Acquisition Oversight 
Process.  The models of the Acquisition Oversight Process and corresponding 
Commission Reports used in this research are introduced.  Chapter Three focuses on the 
seven criteria for an ideal Acquisition Oversight Process.  An analysis of the Commission 
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Studies as they relate to the seven criteria follows.  The examination will focus on data 
collected from reviewed documents.  The results of this analysis provide the basis for 
conclusions and the recommendations for change and future research, found in Chapter 
Four.  
 - 11 -
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction  
 
 
 Concerns about government officials abusing their positions for personal gain 
have existed from the beginning of the republic.  In early Colonial history, accusations of 
favoritism and profiteering in the acquisition process were numerous and oftentimes true.  
Monetary abuses were so prevalent that in 1808 Congress “devised a provision entitled 
‘Officials Not to Benefit,’ which established penalties to prevent these abuses of power” 
(Harma, 1995:13).  With the growing cost of weapons acquisition, questions are currently 
asked as to who oversees weapons acquisition and prevents abuses of taxpayer’s money 
(GAO 1997).  
 Before World War II, budgets for the armed forces were relatively large during 
war and significantly smaller during peace.  In like manner, personnel employed by the 
War and Navy Departments surged during war and dwindled during peace.  
Administrators hired to turn domestic products into military weapons would build a 
bureaucracy of reviewers and auditors then dismantle it after the threat had past.  World 
War II saw the advent of aviation, the birth of the atomic bomb, the genesis of rocket 
power and other technological advances; such weapon systems could not be turned back 
into domestic products easily.  The tooling used to make these weapons were specialized 
and complex.  The time needed to produce these weapons was greater and the costs 
higher.  During the cold war, both Americans and Soviets pursued greater military 
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strength, thereby participating in a great arms race.  In recent years, the higher quality, 
quantity, and technology inherent in America’s military are being sustained in order to 
defend her against enemies and avert war.  Inventing, developing, testing, evaluating, 
buying, and producing implements of war grew into an immensely complex activity.  The 
organizational structure that performed these tasks, collectively called the Acquisition 
Process, became an enduring element of the executive branch. 
 This thesis documents the evolution of the oversight construct placed over the 
Acquisition Process with a concentration on Air Force Acquisition Oversight.  Oversight 
shall be defined as the performance of formal reviews of a Major Defense Acquisition 
Program (MDAP) that approves entry into an Acquisition cycle, which is the creation of 
an Acquisition Program for the purpose of development and eventual procurement.  This 
chapter evaluates relevant literature to ascertain who had performed Acquisition 
Oversight from 1947 to 2003. 
 
Role Definition (1947-1950) 
 
 
 During World War II the rapid expansion of the Army Air Forces “led to a split 
between functions of research and development (R&D) and those of material and 
support; this was accompanied by some dispersal of procurement authority” (Benson 
1996:1).  Beyond the Army Air Corps, the Roosevelt administration attempted to 
consolidate the War Department and Navy Department acquisition decisions under one 
body, that of the War Resources Board.  Due to the charged political atmosphere, the 
board was not used as intended and went into obscurity the same year it was created.  
 - 13 -
Other overarching acquisition boards came and went; first the Office of Emergency 
Management was created; then the Advisory Commission to the Council of National 
Defense was established.  The urgency of the war caused Roosevelt to create the Office 
of Production Management (OPM).  The “OPM assumed responsibilities for production, 
materials, and employment” but because it lacked authority, it criticized military agencies 
instead of manage acquisitions (Jones 1999:253).  In addition, the OPM lacked military 
representatives, technological expertise, or a basis to approve or cancel programs.  
 OPM was disbanded and Roosevelt created the War Production Board to assure 
“the most effective prosecution of war procurement and production” (Jones 1999:254).  
He vested it with presidential powers over all aspects of acquisition from raw materials 
through production; powers the previous boards lacked.  He filled it with “representatives 
from the White House, the War, Navy, and Commerce Departments, the Price 
Administrator, and the Board of Economic Warfare” (Jones 1999:254).  In addition 
Roosevelt established the Office of War Mobilization in 1943 to “develop unified 
programs and to establish policies for the maximum use of the nation’s natural and 
industrial resources for military and civilian needs” (Jones 1999:254).  Therefore, over 
the existing Service Acquisition Process, there were two overarching executive boards.  
Neither the overarching executive boards, nor the services, had the acquisition expertise, 
formalized procedures, or organizational structure to handle the demands for war.  The 
fact that the mobilization efforts succeeded to produce quality weapons systems is 
accredited more to the patriotism of industry rather then the Military Acquisition Process 
(Jones 1999:257).   
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 Emerging from World War II, the War Production Board was abolished in 
November, 1945 (Columbia 2003).  The Office of War Mobilization was also disbanded 
two years latter.  The Army Air Force once again “centralized development, 
procurement, and logistics into an Air Material Command” (Benson 1996:1).  Domestic 
policies regained precedence in Congress while the War and Navy Departments went 
their separate ways.  The Department of War and the Department of the Navy were 
separately administrated, had their own Presidential cabinet seat, fell under separate 
Congressional subcommittees and each had their own version of how America should 
fight a war.  Such separateness was labeled inefficient, costly, and detrimental for the 
prosecution of future wars by then Secretary of War Forrestal and President Truman 
(OSD History 1978:23, 29).  
 Congressional hearings were held in 1944 on the Proposal to Establish a Single 
Department of Armed Forces.  War Department officials advocated the establishment of 
a single Department of the Armed Forces.  Navy Department officials urged further study 
on the issue.  In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established a special committee 
for Reorganization of National Defense.  Its aim was to “study the most efficient and 
practicable organization” of National Defense organizations, namely the Department of 
War and the Department of the Navy (Report on Post-War military Policy as quoted by 
OSD History 1978).  It recommended the establishment of a single Department of the 
Armed Forces but the Joint Chiefs never took action.   
 The Navy launched a separate study, commonly known as the Eberstadt Report, 
named after its chairman Ferdinand Eberstadt.  It advised against the establishment of a 
single defense department.  Instead, it advocated the creation of an Air Department and 
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the use of joint committees.  The report “proposed the establishment of a National 
Security Council and a National Security Resources Board supported by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, a Military Munitions Board, and special agencies for intelligence and research” 
(OSD History 1978:6).  Hearings were again held on the matter but failed to produce a 
solution.   
 Recognizing America’s new role as a world leader, Truman called for a Military 
Department where strategic planning, programming, and budgeting can be achieved, 
unified training established, and duplication between the Services reduced.  The two 
services cooperated through the war to do these activities but during peace such 
cooperation was not guaranteed.  When cooperation could not be obtained, the President 
and Congress had to make a decision (Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman 
as quoted by OSD History 1978:8-13).  President Truman sent a message to Congress 
stating that:  “there is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the 
need for a unified department” (Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman as 
quoted by OSD History 1978:8-13).  On 13 May 1946, President Truman asked the 
Secretaries of War and Navy to reach an agreement.  After compromises were made 
between the two departments, Truman submitted a draft bill to Congress that had the 
approval of both Secretaries and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The bill became Public Law 
253, 80th Congress (61 Stat. 495); better known as the National Security Act of 1947. 
 
 
 National Security Act of 1947.  
 This act made the intent of Congress clear 
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…to provide three military departments for the operations and administration of 
the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marines 
Corps), and the Air Force, with their assigned combat and service components; to 
provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian 
control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of 
the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their 
integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces (National Security 
Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:36)   
 
To this end, the National Military Establishment was created (see Figure 3). 
 
The President
The National Military Establishment 
Headed by the Secretary of Defense (& 3 Assistants)
Joint Chiefs of Staff War Council Research & Development Board Munitions Board 
Secretary of the Army Secretary of the Navy Secretary of the Air Force 
Figure 4. National Military Establishment (Acher 1993:354) 
 Secretary of Defense. 
 The Secretary of Defense headed the new organization.  The Act detailed the 
Secretary of Defense duties as follows: 
1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment 
and for all of the departments and agencies therein. 
 
2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments and 
agencies. 
 
3) Take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the 
fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research. 
 
4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the 
departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; 
formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the 
Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies 
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under the applicable appropriation Act:  PROVIDED, That nothing herein 
contained shall prevent the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or 
the Secretary of the Air Force from presenting to the President or the Director of 
the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any report or 
recommendation relating to his department which he may deem necessary:  AND 
PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Department of the Army, the Department of the 
Navy, and the Department of the Air Force shall be administered as individual 
executive departments by their respective Secretaries and all powers and duties 
relating to such departments not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of 
Defense by this Act shall be retained by each of their respective Secretaries.  
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:40-41) 
 
Take note of the two clauses in the Act that limited the Secretary of Defense’s powers; in 
the fourth clause his powers are limited to those specifically granted him, and all other 
powers were retained by the Services; secondly, the Services were granted the ability to 
appeal decisions to the President or the Director of the Budget.  Even if the Secretary had 
the Presidential powers over the Services, he did not have the staff to assist him in those 
duties.  Within the Act, the Secretary of Defense was given a small staff composed of 
three assistants, none of whom could be military.  He was to perform duties through the 
use of several joint agencies, including the War Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions 
Board, and Research and Development Board.   
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 
 JCS was created to coordinate Army and Navy actions during World War II.  In 
the Act the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were as “principal military advisors to the 
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense”  
1) To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the 
military forces. 
 
2) To prepare joint logistic plans and the assign to the military services logistic 
responsibilities in accordance with such plans. 
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3) To establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified 
commands are in the interest of national security. 
 
4) To formulate policies for joint training of the military forces.  
 
5) To formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the 
military forces. 
 
6) To review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in 
accordance with strategic and logistic plans. 
 
7) To provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of 
the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the 
United Nations.  (National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 
1978:45) 
 
The members of the JCS wore two hats, one as Service Chief, and the other as an advisor 
void of service specific blinders.  The JCS were ineffective because of this duality.  The 
JCS had lacked a central figure to decide definitively on a course of action therefore the 
President and Congress had to decide for them. 
 The Munitions Board. 
 The Munitions Board was “to support the strategic and logistic plans prepared by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff” by performing the following duties. 
1) Coordinate…procurement, production, and distribution plans of the 
departments and agencies comprising the Establishment. 
 
2) Plan for the military aspects of industrial mobilization. 
 
3) Recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities. 
 
4) Prepare estimates of potential production procurement, and personnel for use 
in evaluation of the logistic feasibility of strategic operations. 
 
5) Determine relative priorities of the various segments of the military 
procurement programs. 
 
6) Supervise such subordinate agencies as are or may be created to consider the 
subjects falling within the scope of the Board’s responsibilities. 
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7) Make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve existing inter-
service agencies operating in the fields of procurement, production, and 
distribution in such manner as to promote efficiency and economy. 
 
8) Maintain liaison with other departments and agencies for the proper 
correlation of military requirements with the civilian economy, particularly in 
regard to the procurement. 
 
9) Assemble and review material and personnel requirements. 
       (National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:46) 
 
Within the Act are words such as supervise, coordinate, and recommend.  The Board was 
not given overall authority to fulfill their responsibilities.   
 The Research and Development Board  
 The Research and Development Board was “to advise the Secretary of Defense as 
to the status of scientific research relative to the national security, and to assist him in 
assuring adequate provision for research and development on scientific problems relating 
to the national security.”  According to the Act the Research and Development Board had 
the following duties. 
1) Prepare a complete and integrated program of research and development for 
military purposes. 
 
2) Advise with regard to trends in scientific research relating to national security 
and measures necessary to assure continued and increasing progress. 
 
3) Recommend measure of coordination of research and development among the 
military departments, and allocation among them of responsibilities for 
specific programs of joint interest. 
 
4) Formulate policy for the National Military Establishment in connection with 
research and development matters involving agencies outside the National 
Military Establishment. 
 
5) Consider the interaction of research and development and strategy, and to 
advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection therewith.  
     (National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:47) 
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The Act allows the R&D board to advise and recommend only.  The Act is criticized for 
making the Service representatives on the two boards co-equal to the Chairman of each 
Board (Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report as republished in Defense Policy 1988:162).  
In effect the R&D Board and the Munitions Board had no command over the Services; 
any consolidation of resources in the fields of research and development, procurement, 
production, and distribution would require Service agreement and cooperation.  The 
Board’s recommendations were mostly ignored.   
 The Air Force. 
 The Air Force achieved its independence through this Act.  As defined by the Act, 
the United States Air Force shall include:  
aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned.  It shall be 
organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and 
defensive air operations.  The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of 
the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise 
assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the 
expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.  
(National Security Act of 1947 as quoted by OSD History 1978:45) 
 
The new Department of the Air Force looked to Air Material Command (AMC) to be its 
sole “manger of development, testing, procurement, and logistics” (Benson 1996:9).  
Unfortunately, AMC was more concerned with preserving and improving the assets 
inherited from the Army than developing the next generation of aircraft.  Unlike the 
Army and the Navy, the Air Force relied heavily on contractors for R&D services rather 
then in-house personnel.  Contractors and commercial R&D labs presented their products 
to Air Force procurement officers in the Engineering Division or the Material Division 
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within AMC.  AMC was supported by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Material stationed in 
Washington D.C. (Benson 1996:9-10).  
 Executive Order 9877. 
 This executive order was signed by President Truman on the same day that he 
signed the National Security Act of 1947.  The language used to describe the function of 
the DoD and each service contained in the Executive Order, differed from the wording in 
the Act.  The difference in language was a lightning rod with “the continuing dispute 
between the Navy and the Air Force over responsibility for air missions” (U.S. DoD JCS 
files as quoted by OSD History 1978:270).  In the months to follow, the Joint Chiefs 
were employed to hash out an agreement.  After four months of discussion, the JCS 
reported that they had failed to reach agreements and asked that these issues be “resolved 
by higher authority” (U.S. DoD JCS files as quoted by OSD History 1978:275).  
Secretary Forrestal then held two meetings with JCS, one lasted five days in Key West, 
Florida.  The agreement latter became known as the Key West Agreement.   
 Executive Order 9877 was rescinded by Executive Order 9950, its language 
modified to more closely match the language in the Act.  In a Memorandum from the 
Key West Conference, JCS acquisition role was further defined: 
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It is intended that an individual Service is to be permitted to carry through the 
development stage any material improvement program or new weapon 
development program considered by the Service to be essential in the interest of 
increased effectiveness of its weapons, material, or equipment.  The ultimate 
application and utilization of the product of such a development program shall, of 
course, be subject to the examination and recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff on the basis of its contributions to the over-all war effort.  (OSD History 
1978:286)   
 
The JCS was to advise the President on the application of the product but were not to 
disturb the Acquisition Process as performed by the Services.   
 Forrestal Recommendations.   
 With any new organization, lessons are learned and changes are made.  The first 
Secretary of Defense, James V. Forrestal, made recommendations in his first annual 
report.  It included the following:  
1) Create a separate staff for the Secretary of Defense. 
 
2) Provision of an Under Secretary of Defense. 
 
3) Provision of a Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 
4) Enlargement of the Joint Staff. 
 
5) Increased Secretary of Defense’s authority over the Military Departments. 
 
6) Removal of the Service Secretaries from membership on the National Security 
Council; a body that advised the President directly.  (Acker 1993:57) 
 
His recommendation influenced President Truman to commission further study on the 
National Military Establishment. 
 Hoover Commission.   
 The Hoover Commission formally Commission on Organization of the U.S. 
Executive Branch was formed to find ways “to improve operations and to reduce costs” 
of the existing organization” (OSD History 1978:65).  Within the Hoover Commission 
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was created the Committee on the National Security Organization, known as the 
Eberstadt Task Force.  The Hoover Commission studied the Eberstadt Task Force Report 
and adopted its conclusions in six recommendations (see Table 2).  
Table 2. Hoover I Recommendations 
1)  The Secretary of Defense should have full 
power over preparation of the budget and 
expenditures. 
4)  More adequate and effective relations 
should be developed at the working level 
among the appropriate committees of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security 
Council, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Research and Development Board, Munitions 
Board, and the National Security Resource 
Board. 
 
2)  The Secretary of Defense should have full 
statutory authority now vested in the service 
departments and full authority for the 
procurement and management of supplies 
and material.    
 5)  Steps be made to implement the 
recommendations made by the Commission 
regarding medical departments. 
3)  The Secretary of Defense should have 
powers over military personnel 
administration, military education, training, 
recruitment, promotion and transfers among 
the services.  He should also have full 
authority to prescribe uniform personnel 
policies for civilian and military personnel 
throughout the several services. 
 
6)  The President should take immediate 
steps to prepare for civilian defense.  
Emergency plans for civilian and industrial 
mobilization should be promptly and 
continuously revised.  Defenses for 
unconventional warfare should be developed.
(The National Security Organization, A Report to Congress as quoted by OSD History 1979:75-77)
 
 President Truman reviewed the proposed changes over the winter of 1948.  He 
incorporated the Administration’s recommendations in a message to Congress 
transmitted on 7 March 1949.  In his message, Truman reviewed lessons learned from 
World War II and urged congress to strengthen the Secretary of Defense into more then 
an administrator limited to specified items into “a fully responsible official with authority 
adequate to meet his responsibility, whom the President and the congress can hold 
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accountable” (Public papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman as quoted by OSD 
History 1979:79) 
 National Security Act of 1949.  
 Congress passed a 1949 amendment to the National Security Act and 
accomplished the following: 
1) Changed the name of the National Military Establishment into the Department 
of Defense (DoD).   
 
2) The Secretary of Defense was given a Deputy and three Assistant Secretaries. 
 
3) The Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was created as a non-voting 
member, senior in rank to all other military officers.  He was to expedite the 
JCS business. 
 
4) Increased the Joint Staff from 100 to 210 officers. 
 
5) Made the Department of Defense into an Executive Department.  Reduced the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force from Executive Departments into Military 
Departments under the Department of Defense.  Strengthened the Secretary of 
Defense’s powers over the three Services’ budgets and the Service members.  
He was to provide “direction, authority, and control” over the services. (Jones 
1999:323) 
 
6) The Service Secretaries were removed from the National Security Council. 
 
7) Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the R&D Board were given powers of 
decision. 
 
8) Services were still “separately administered,” and retained powers to appeal 
decisions with the President and Congress even after this act.  (Acher 
1993:61).   
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Secretary of Defense 
Advisors:   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Secretary of the Air Force OSD Munitions Board,  
OSD R&D Board 
    
 
Initial organization of oversight activities. 
 The resultant Acquisition Oversight construct is depicted in Figure 4.  The 
hierarchy of oversight was finally made clear, yet the process suffered from several 
maladies.  The Air Force lacked in-house experts capable of harnessing science and 
technology for the future, therefore research and development was neglected.  The Air 
Force focused their efforts on logistical management and building a supply system 
separate from the Army.  The Air Force lacked support equipment and components and 
the expertise to maintain them; therefore it had to rely heavily on the Army.  The Air 
Force Acquisition Process inherited traits from the Army that were unsuited to the 
rapidly changing aircraft technology.  An Air Force Historian describes the process as a 
“traditional practice of procuring the airframe, engines, navigation aids, fire control 
Air Material Command
Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Material 
Engineering Divisions 
Air Force Chief of Staff 
Material Divisions 
Air Force Procurement Officers Air Force Procurement Officers 
Figure 5: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1949 
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system, ground equipment, etc., from different sources and then relying on the airframe 
manufacturer to fit them together and make them function as a unit” (Benson 1996:11-
12).  Such disconnects led to the expensive practice of post-production reworks  
 Every Service brought up a type of Acquisition Process that was thick with 
bureaucracies, and contracting practices meant to protect it from Congressional reviews 
and contractor lawsuits.  To protect its budget from cutbacks, each service lobbied 
Congress for weapon system funding, often ending in the cannibalization of sister 
services for funds.  This type of inter-service rivalries lead to “duplication in weapons 
development, as the services fought for proprietorship of a specific mission by seeking to 
outdo rivals in developing weapons appropriate for that mission” (McNaugher 1989:39).   
 In the OSD, statutory organizations proved to be ineffective.  The Munitions 
Board reviewed requirements surfaced by the JCS and issued policies on Acquisition, but 
little was enforced or adhered to by the Services.  The R&D Board suffered from the 
same malady (Jones 1999:325).  These boards advised the Secretary of Defense and were 
without real power.  The Secretary of Defense himself seemed more like a “mediator 
between the President and the services and among the services” (Weigley as quoted by 
Jones 1999:323).  Oversight was provided internally by Air Force officials (Benson 
1995:9).   
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Decade of Reorganization (1950-1960) 
 
 
 Current affairs forced the Truman Administration to rethink the unhappy 
compromise of the National Security Act as amended in 1949.  The Korean War lasted 
from 1950 to 1953, a war meant to contain communism; it ended in a stalemate at the 49th 
parallel.  The Soviets successfully tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1953, igniting fears 
of nuclear war.  The race was on to develop a system capable of delivering the bomb.  
Hence the missile crisis era was born.  The DoD had to rethink and reorganize to handle 
developing threats (Benson 1996:11). 
 The concept of program manager came into existence around 1950.  A program 
manager (PM) is defined as “the individual designated…to manage an acquisition 
program” (DoD 2003).  PMs managed what was known in 1951 as the Weapon System 
Project Office (WSPO), a body comprised of representatives from various agencies 
involved in developing and operating the system (Benson 1995:12).  In 1960, the WSPO 
was renamed the System Program Offices (SPO) in recognition of the “growing 
importance of C3 [Command, Control and Communications], surveillance, and other 
technologies that supported war fighting” (Benson 1996:15).   
 Related to the PM concept is the idea of a weapons systems approach to 
development.  This approach integrated the design of the entire weapon system, which 
may include the services, facilities, and trained personnel required to operate it besides 
the weapon itself (McNaugher 1989:33).  A weapon system was defined in 1958 as “the 
entire complex of equipment, support facilities, trained manpower, and concept for 
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employment necessary to make a weapon system operational” (The Department of 
Defense as quoted by Jones 1999:327).   
 Reorganization of the Air Force.   
 The Air Force acknowledged the need for R&D by creating the Research and 
Development Command on 23 January 1950.  It was composed of the Research, 
Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) components of AMC and named the 
Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) (Benson 1995:11).  The ARDC “did 
not assume formal responsibilities for weapon development until 1951” (McNaugher 
1989:35).  In 1953, the Air Force established a Special Assistant for Research and 
Development as part of the Secretariat; the position was redesignated Assistant Secretary 
for Research and Development in 1955.  At the same time, the Air Staff created a new 
Deputy Chief of Staff position for Development with “directorates for R&D and 
Requirements” (Benson 1995:11) (see Figure 6).  AMC continued to handle procurement 
and logistics under the purview of the Assistant Secretary for Material  
Separation of development and procurement into two major commands with 
parallel reporting channels and loyalties hindered the management of a MDAP.  To 
decrease conflicts, development programs would start under direction of ARDC and then 
“transfer of program management responsibility from ARDC to AMC” would occur “at 
the time of a production decision” (Benson 1996:12).  Testing was performed by the Air 
Proving Ground Command (APGC) or operational units prior to the production phase.  
The Air Proving Ground Command was decommissioned in 1958 for the purposes of 
reducing expenditures.  In its place the Air Force employed the contractor, ARDC test 
centers, and operational units to perform testing. 
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 Reorganization of the Department of Defense.   
 In a letter to President Truman dated 18 November 1952, former Secretary of 
Defense Robert Lovett outlined some weaknesses in the organization of the DoD.   
1) The Secretary of Defense is required “to make use of inter-service Committees 
for much of his staff work” and is prohibited from “having a military staff.”  As a 
result, the Secretary of Defense will be “unable to handle the distribution of 
shortages in an efficient and direct fashion.” 
 
2) The Act provides that the three services be “separately administered” yet be under 
the “direction, authority and control” of the Secretary of Defense.  In the fields of 
supply, warehousing, and issue the Secretary of Defense has encountered 
resistance to unification and efficiency. 
 
3) The three statutory agencies:  JCS, the Munitions Board, and the Research and 
Development Board all suffer from the three weaknesses.   
a. “excessive rigid statutory prescriptions of functions 
b. rigid statutory composition  
c. the requirements in the statute that each agency perform functions 
inappropriate, if not actually impossible, for it to perform efficiently and 
expeditiously.” 
 
4) The language in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, does not make 
clear whether or not the JCS are directly under the Secretary of Defense. 
 
5) The two boards “compels three of the four members to sit as judges on their own 
requests and to pass on estimates of production, on schedules, and on 
procurement and distributing systems for which they are each responsible in a 
separately administered Service.” 
 
6) There is ambiguity in the lines of authority and responsibility that can be 
eliminated by abolishing the two boards and establishing under secretaries within 
OSD to perform acquisition functions.  (Source:  Press Release as quoted by OSD 
History 1978:115-126) 
 
Several of these concerns were readdressed by the Committee on Department of Defense 
Organization, more commonly known as the Rockefeller Committee, named so after its 
chairman, Nelson A. Rockefeller.   
 Rockefeller Committee.   
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 In 1953 the Committee on Department of Defense Organization Report pointed 
out three weaknesses in the roles performed by DoD personnel.  They were as follows: 
1) Each service had developed roles, missions, and acquisition priorities separate 
from another.  Therefore, Services engaged in competition for funding of new 
weapons for potentially overlapping even competing missions and roles.  
 
2) JCS members were Service loyal in their recommendations to the Secretary of 
Defense.  Also their responsibilities did not include presenting an integrated, 
strategic plan for national defense. 
 
3) The Secretary of Defense spent too much time detangling inter-Service 
disputes and too little on generating integrated military policies. (Acker 
1993:66) 
 
Changes recommended by the Committee include 1) the Secretary of Defense making 
greater use of the three military department Secretaries and the Armed Forces Policy 
Council and 2) the JCS delegating administrative duties down, and increasing the number 
of Assistant Secretaries from three to nine (one of them being the Assistant Secretary 
(R&D)) (see Table 3).  President Eisenhower reviewed the Rockefeller Committee 
Report and submitted his recommendations to Congress on 30 April 1953.   
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 Reorganization Plan No. 6.   
 President Eisenhower took office in 1953 and immediately called for DoD 
reorganization to further strengthen the Secretary of Defense.  He abolished the 
Munitions and R&D Boards with his Reorganization Plan No. 6 effective 30 June 1953 
(see Figure 5).  This happened after several congressional investigations into the two 
boards.   
One fault cited was  ‘that each member, except for the chairman, was both a 
claimant and a judge of his own requests’ making it ‘extremely difficult, if not 
impossible’ at times of serious shortages of materiel and manpower [to scale back 
or eliminate a weapon from the acquisition process] (Kintner, as quoted by Jones 
1999:350). 
 
Table 3. Rockefeller Committee Recommendations 
1)  The direction, authority, and control of 
the Secretary of Defense over all agencies 
within the Department should be 
confirmed. 
4)  “The Secretary of Defense should use 
the Armed Forces Policy Council as his 
principal advisory group on major 
problems of policy in which he requires 
both civilian and military advice.”  
2)  “The Secretaries of the military 
departments, subject to the direction, 
authority, and control of the Secretary of 
Defense, should be the operating heads of 
their respective departments in all aspects.”  
 
5)  The Secretary of Defense should “be 
free to adjust from time to time the 
assignment of staff functions within his 
own office in a flexible and expeditious 
manner.”  Therefore the two boards 
created by statute should be abolished and 
additional Assistant Secretaries authorized 
to take their place. 
 
3)  The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to more 
effectively work as a unified planning 
agency, should work closely with the 
Secretary of Defense, delegate their less 
important duties, and be allowed to 
organize the Joint Staff as necessary.  
Unified Commands should be assigned to a 
military department instead of to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 
 
6)  Military personnel in OSD should 
receive equal opportunity and 
consideration as those outside OSD. 
(Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History 1979:128-149)
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Secretary of Defense 
  
In the place of the two boards President Eisenhower designated the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Supply and Logistics) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D).  The 
Assistant Secretary positions were devised as purely advisory, but their strategic 
relationship to the Secretary of Defense often put them in direct control over weapons 
acquisitions (Bair 1994:9).   
 Also included in the Reorganization Plan No. 6 were the following: the 
appointment of a Director of Joint Staff, a General Council and six additional Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense; strengthen the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Program Managers 
Air Research & 
Development Command 
Air Material Command  
Air Material Areas
Deputy Chief of Staff for Material 
Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Development 
Assistant Secretary of Supply and Assistant Secretary of Research and Engineering
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Figure 6: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1955 
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by allowing him voting rights; and providing that the Chairman of JCS be appointed by 
the Secretary of Defense and President, not by members of the JCS as previously agreed 
to in the West Keys Agreement.  Neither the House nor the Senate took adverse actions 
against this plan within the 60 day window and the plan went into effect 30 June 1953. 
 Hoover II.   
 On 10 July 1953 a new Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of 
the Government, more commonly known as the Second Hoover Commission was 
established to “promote economy, efficiency, and improved services in the transaction of 
the public business” (Comments on the Hoover Commission Report as quoted by 
Defense Policy 1988:8).  The Commission completed its report after two years; it 
contained 19 recommendations to improve the DoD as seen in Table 4.   
 Being proactive the DoD merged the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) and 
Applications Engineering into the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) in 1957.  In a 
letter to Congress Secretary of Defense Wilson summarized the DoD response to the 
Second Hover Commission.  In regards to role clarification, coordination efforts were 
redoubled and lines of authority better clarified.  In regards to improving management of 
common supply and service activities, DoD launched the Single Manager Plan which 
provided a Single Manager in a designated area from procurement through distribution.  
This program acts in lieu of a civilian controlled supply agency.  On the other 
recommendations, the Secretary of Defense fully agreed with the recommendations.  
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Table 4. Hoover II Recommendations 
1)  The Secretary of Defense should create 
a civilian position with authority over 
military requirements 
10)  The supply agency’s director should be 
appointed by the President. 
 
 11)  The Secretary of Defense should make 
semi-annual reports on supply and logistics 
to Congress. 
2)  The Secretary of Defense should 
regroup functions under Assistant 
Secretaries for logistics, research and 
development, personnel and finance.   
 
12)  Laws should be changed and incentives 
increased to attract and hold able 
administrators. 
 
3)  The Secretary of Defense should 
appoint a principal career assistant for each 
Assistant Secretary. 
 
13)  Military and Civilian personnel should 
be better positioned to optimize utilization.  
4)  Service Secretaries should have similar 
Assistant Secretaries in Recommendation 
2. 
 
14)  Support manager roles should be 
defined. 
  
5)  Chiefs of Staff should relate to support 
activities as planners, requesters, and users.
15)  Standards of manager selection, training, 
promotion and compensation should be 
uniform.  
6)  Departmental Assistant Secretaries for 
should control supply and service activities
 
16)  Military Secretaries should use the 
career management program in activities 
under them. 
 
7)  Departmental Assistant Secretaries for 
Research and Development (R&D) should 
have clear responsibility for coordinating 
R&D. 
 
17)  DoD should improve management over 
budgets, working capital funds, and 
inventory.  
8)  A separate civilian-managed common 
supply agency should be established 
 
18)  Departmental Assistant Secretaries for 
Financial Management (FM) should screen 
requirements and review budgets 
 
9)  The supply agency should have a 
strictly supporting role for the agency.  
19)  Laws should be passed to give 
secretaries in Recommendation 18 exclusive 
control of FMs 
(US Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch as quoted by OSD History 
1979:164-165)
 
 
 
 
 - 35 -
 The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. 
 This Act provided that the Services were to be “separately organized” versus the 
language “separately administered” used in previous acts.  The Secretary of Defense was 
given stronger powers to better define the Services respective roles and missions.  
Administrative duties of the Secretary of Defense were absorbed by assistant secretaries.  
Assistant Secretaries could now give orders regarding their respective areas of 
responsibilities provided such orders first go through the Service Secretaries (Acker 
1993:71).  Specifically, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D) was upgraded to 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering.  The Director was given specific powers 
over weapons acquisition (Benson 1995:14).  This act separated the Operation 
Commands from the Service to have a user and supplier relationship.  Each Service was 
to provide training, support, and logistics to operational commands who were directed by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the command of the Secretary of Defense.   
 Establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in 1958.   
 On 4 October 1957 the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik I.   
The world's first artificial satellite was about the size of a basketball, weighed 
only 183 pounds, and took about 98 minutes to orbit the Earth on its elliptical 
path. That launch ushered in new political, military, technological, and scientific 
developments. While the Sputnik launch was a single event, it marked the start of 
the space age and the U.S.-U.S.S.R space race.  (NASA 2003)   
 
On 3 November 1957 the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik II which had a larger 
payload.  President Eisenhower warned the American people how the Soviet’s 
achievements threatened national security.  He stated “that any new missile or related 
program hereafter originated will, whenever practicable, be put under a single manager 
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and administered without regard to the separate services” (Public Papers of the 
Presidents:  Eisenhower as quoted by OSD History 1979:171).  
 On 7 January 1958 President Eisenhower requested $10 million for the formation 
of an Advanced Research Projects Agency.  Secretary of Defense McElroy explained that 
it would be a separate agency that would “manage new weapon programs during the 
early stages of research and exploratory development” (Hearings on the Ballistic Missile 
Program as quoted by OSD History 1979:172).  President Eisenhower signed Public law 
85-325 that said in part 
The Secretary or his designee is authorized to perform assigned research and 
development projects: by contract with private business entities, educational or 
research institutions, or other agencies of the Government, through one or more of 
the military departments, or by utilizing employees and consultants of the 
Department of Defense. 
 
The Secretary of Defense shall assign any weapons systems developed to such 
military department or departments for production and operational control as he 
may determine.  (Public law 85-325 72 Stat. 11 as quoted by OSD history 
1979:173) 
 
The Advance Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was chartered on 7 February 1958.  It 
was “to explore new technologies ‘in an objective and detached manner’ that precluded 
the services ‘from acquiring proprietary interest in their projects’” (McNamara 1989:41).  
It was renamed Defense Advance Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1972. 
 Conclusion of Decade.  
 The Secretary of Defense started the decade as an arbitrator between Services.  
After all the reorganization acts, his role became one of Armed Forces manager and sole 
advisor to the President in matters of Defense.  In the area of acquisition, the Secretary of 
Defense had no say in 1947 but emerged from the decade with increased powers.  He 
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now had the power to cancel and transfer Service programs and their appropriations.  He 
had a budget line item, direct from Congress, to conduct R&D programs at the DoD 
level.  In essence, the Secretary of Defense had authority over all aspects of acquisition; 
that of research, development and procurement.  Services were to give OSD staff their 
“full cooperation” (Acker 1993:66).  Research and development gained structure as 
Assistant Secretaries were given administrative powers over the development of new 
technologies for the purpose of incorporating them into military hardware.  Over the 
decade, the Acquisition Process accumulated layers of oversight and a library of 
acquisition doctrine (McNaugher 1989:35).   
 Oversight in 1959 existed as depicted in Figure 6.  The PM, supported by the 
SPO, markets a development program before higher levels of Air Force and DoD.  
Problems of inter-service rivalries, duplication of efforts, and other inefficiencies 
continued to plague the DoD.  Pentagon and OSD decision makers were engaged daily 
for point-on-point system analysis thereby elongating the Acquisition Process.  One 
historian notes that acquisition program information surfaced to higher levels was often 
incomplete and unsuited for milestone decisions (Benson 1996:16).   
Concern over cost overruns, performance short-comings, and missed deadlines 
prompted the new Kennedy Administration to undertake a major review and 
overhaul of the weapons acquisition process.  The solution, according to the 
prevailing view, was to adopt a more business-like approach.  Secretary of 
Defense McNamara, the former president of the Ford Motor Co., brought just that 
kind of experience and management philosophy to the Pentagon job. (Defense 
Policy 1988:10) 
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Secretary of Defense 
 
 
Era of McNamara (1961 – 1968) 
 
 
 Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara served from 1961 to 1968, the longest 
of any other Secretary.  He is credited with bringing order and standardization to 
acquisition management (McNaugher 1989:63).  He centralized control over budget 
matters, reduced redundant acquisition programs, and further refined the acquisition 
process through the introduction of business concepts.   
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 Secretary McNamara brought to fruition the budget overhaul called for by the 
first Hoover Commission.   
McNamara sought and instituted a quantitative budgeting system to match his 
view of military strategy and policy that bridged planning and programming, 
often disconnected in the past, while flexible enough to link priorities and 
requirements. (Jones 1999:328) 
 
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) centered on “out year” 
requirements as outlined in a Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).  He authored the strategic 
forces program category, which, unlike previous budgetary methods that grouped 
acquisition programs by service, grouped acquisition programs by similar capabilities.  In 
theory, comparisons between bombers, fighters, and missiles could be made across 
services and the program with the greatest value would win a budget, the others being 
terminated or delayed.   
 Using the refined arts of systems analysis (or cost-effectiveness analysis), and 
operations research, Secretary McNamara terminated several weapons projects in the 
interest of reducing acquisition cost and eliminating redundancies.   
These choices were often made in the face of stiff political opposition.  
McNamara often incurred the wrath of a particular services as well as members of 
Congress interested in particular projects. (McNaugher 1989:55) 
 
He formed the Office of System Analysis to perform cost-effectiveness studies and 
encouraged the Services to do likewise.  A new position of Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Systems Analysis) was established on 10 September 1965.   
 Canceling programs was easier then trying to get Services to change methods.  
That is to move “away from allowing weapons projects to proliferate and toward fewer 
but more important and strategically appropriate development programs” (McNaugher 
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1989:58).  President Kennedy supported a flexible response military strategy which was 
drastically different from the mass retaliation supported in past administrations (Jones 
1999:332).  Secretary McNamara was hard pressed to get the Services to write 
requirements for more conventional weapons in lieu of nuclear weapons and therefore 
found himself and his staff in the business of writing requirements for the Services 
(McNaugher 1989:59).  His best efforts to control the Acquisition Process drew political 
fire.  Towards the end of his tenure, Service Chiefs made greater use of their rights to 
address Congress directly per the National Security Act of 1947 as amended.  With 
Congressional help, Service Chiefs limited Secretary McNamara’s powers (McNaugher 
1989:54).   
 Late in his tenure Secretary McNamara introduced the concept of “Total Package 
Procurement” that gave system contractors the responsibility to submit developmental 
and production costs of system as well as estimate some operational costs (McNaugher 
1989:62).  This concept greatly increased the “proliferation of detailed proposals, studies, 
and paper competitions, followed up by reports, audits, program reviews, and other 
oversight tools” (Benson 1996:16).  Technology advances at unpredictable speeds and in 
divergent directions such that assigning a hard target for budget and schedule led to 
unrealistic bids and paper promises.  Total Package Procurement was abandoned after 
1966 because it was out of touch with the realities of both the uncertainty inherent in 
technology development and the ability of defense industrial base to absorb the cost of 
unknowns (Jones 1999:329).   
 
 Other concepts conceived by McNamara are still in  
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use in various forms, including: value engineering; information systems for 
planning and control of schedules and costs; technical data management; proposal 
evaluation and source selection; defense standardization; improved quality 
assurance; configuration management; work breakdown structure; and integrated 
logistics support for systems and equipment (Jones 1999:329).   
 
For more information on these concepts see Acher’s book Acquiring Defense Systems: A 
Quest for the best. 
 Reorganization.  
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) was combined with the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Properties and Installations) in 1961 to form the position 
of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).  The Air Force realigned 
their assets and established management structures parallel to DoD (see Figure 7).  
ARDC became the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC) with the procurement powers 
previously attributed the AMC on 1 April 1961.  In turn, AMC became the Air Force 
Logistics Command (AFLC), now solely responsible for Logistics (Benson 1996:15).  
“At a mutually agreed time after deployment, a program management responsibility 
transfer (PMRT) between an AFSC product division and an AFLC logistic center would 
occur” (Benson 1996:16).   
 AFSC and the newly formed Office of Aerospace Research handled R&D matters 
for the Service (Jones 1999:363).  In 1962, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Material) and 
(Development) were combined into the Deputy Chief of Staff (Systems and Logistics) 
who would provide guidance to the two Major Commands.  Also created was a Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Research and Technology to oversee technologies not specific to a 
particular weapons system (Jones 1999:363).  MDAP “managers in the field were to use 
‘red line’ procedures to report directly to system offices in the Pentagon for decisions by 
 - 42 -
a Systems Review Board” (Benson 1996:15).  In 1966, the SPOs were realigned under 
new divisions; “Aeronautical Systems Division, Armament Division, Electronic Systems 
Division, Space Systems Division, Ballistic Missile Division, and Aerospace Medial 
Division” (Benson 1995:16).   
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Oversight Outgrowth (1969 – 1977) 
 
 
 America’s public and its legislators were becoming disenchanted with the 
Vietnam War and the military’s role in increasing the National Deficit.  Congress made 
the Defense budget a primary target for budget cuts.  To better understand acquisition 
costs, Congress passed Public Law 94-106 mandating System Acquisition Reports 
(SARs) be submitted by DoD at the end of each quarter to provided official data on the 
status of all MDAPs in April of 1969 (Acker 1993:151).   
 Packard Initiatives.   
 Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard responded with ten initiatives aimed 
at improving weapons acquisition first published in 1970 (see Table 5).  Secretary 
Packard called for several changes to make DoD more business-like.   
New policies included…more realistic cost estimates, more precisely defined 
operational requirements, technical risk analyses, less concurrency in favor of 
sequential schedules, a return to the practice of building prototypes, and for 
aircraft, competitive fly-offs between contractors.  (Benson 1995:17)   
 
He established the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC), later to be 
renamed the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) in 1987 (Srull 1998:5).  This new body 
would review MDAPs at milestone points and advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
on the MDAP status and readiness.  Among the members of the DSARC were:  as 
Chairman the Director, Defense Research and Engineering; the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics), (Systems Analysis), and (Comptroller) (Srull 
1998:6).  The Air Force response was to create an Air Force System Review Council 
(AFSARC) as well as support panels to help keep track of MDAP progress (Benson 
1995:19).   
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Table 5. Packard Initiatives 
Improve the quality of information 
available from development. 
Restore competition to weapons 
acquisition. 
  
8)  Reduce risk and stimulate contractor 
efforts during development . 
1)  Use more hardware testing.   
 
 2)  Establish Operational Test and 
Evaluation agencies separate from 
developing commands 
9)  Prime-contractor competition through 
full-scale development to avoid developer 
monopoly at the time the initial production 
contract is negotiated. 
 
3)  establish the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG) within OSD 
to improve the quality of cost estimates 
during development. 
 
-- Regulate the OSD’s involvement in 
acquisition. 
  
10)  Establish a Defense System 
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC).  It 
shall meet to approve the start of 
development (DSARC I), meet again to 
decide on full-scale development (DSARC 
II), and meets a third time to approve the 
move to production. 
Enhance program flexibility. 
 
4)  Practice “design-to-cost” 
 
5)  Account for all “life-cycle costs” 
 
6)  Strengthen PM independence and 
lengthen their tenures. 
 
7)  Reduce production concurrency…fly 
before you buy 
(As summarized by McNaugher 1989:67-68)
 
 The Fitzhugh Commission.   
 The practice of concurrency, that is putting weapons into production prior to 
flight testing, yielded weapons that did not perform as advertised.  “In a sample of 22 
weapon systems deployed to Southeast Asia [Vietnam] from 1965-1970, DoD studies 
found all but one had suffered major deficiencies in the field” (Benson 1996:17).  In the 
midst of an unpopular war, battered by unfavorable analysis, and faced with acquisition 
cost overruns, the Nixon Administration commissioned a new study called the Blue 
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Ribbon Defense Panel headed by Gilbert Fitzhugh on July 1969, more commonly known 
as the Fitzhugh Commission.   
 The 16 member panel took a year to publish their findings (OSD History 
1978:249).  This panel was “instructed to study, report, and make recommendations on 
the organization and management of the Department of Defense” with a greater emphasis 
on the Acquisition Process then the two Hoover Commission (Defense Policy 1988:144).  
The panel’s report contained 113 recommendations (OSD History 1978:249).  One 
finding relating to the acquisition oversight states “the diffusion of responsibility and 
accountability, the freedom to ‘pass the buck’ to the top on hard decisions, and the 
opportunity to use the extensive coordination process to advance parochial objectives, are 
circumstances to which many in the Department have adapted comfortably” (Barrett 
1983:xxiv).  The need for accountability seems to pervade the Fitzhugh Commission 
Recommendations.  Table 6 charts findings and recommendations pertaining to the 
Acquisition Process.   
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Table 6. Fitzhugh Commission Recommendations 
1) Decentralized Authority:   4) Research and Development: 
Observation:
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  Effective civilian 
control is impaired by the generally 
excessive centralization of decision-
making authority at the level of the 
Secretary of Defense.   
 Recommendation:  A new 
development policy for weapons 
systems and other hardware should be 
formulated and promulgated to cause a 
reduction of technical risks through 
demonstrated hardware before full-
scale development, and to provide the 
needed flexibility in acquisition 
strategies.   
Recommendation:  The functions 
of the Department of Defense should 
be divided into three major groupings:  
Operations, Resource Management, 
and Evaluation…Each of these major 
groups should report to the Secretary 
of Defense through a separate Deputy 
Secretary 
 
5) Program and Project Management 
 Recommendation:  The 
effectiveness of program or project 
management should be improved by:  
a) Establishing a career specialty 
code for Program managers in 
each Military Service and 
developing selection and training 
criteria that will ensure the 
availability of an adequate 
number of qualified officers.  The 
criteria should emphasize 
achieving a reasonable balance 
between the needs for knowledge 
of operational requirements and 
experience in management; 
2) Operational Test and Evaluation 
(OT&E):   
Observation:  OT&E has been too 
infrequent, poorly designed and 
executed, and generally inadequate. 
Recommendation:  A Defense Test 
Agency should be created to perform 
the functions of overview of all 
Defense test and evaluation, … with 
particular emphasis on operational 
testing, and on systems and 
equipments which span Service lines 
 b) Increasing the use of trained 
civilian personnel as program 
managers;  
3) Career and Professional Development:  
Observation:  The promotion and 
rotation systems of the Military 
Services do not facilitate career 
development in the technical and 
professional activities,  
c) Providing authority 
commensurate with the assigned 
responsibility and more direct 
reporting lines for program 
managers, particularly those 
operating in matrix organizational 
arrangements; and 
Recommendation:  Specialist 
career should be established for 
officers in such staff, technical and 
professional fields as research, 
development, intelligence, 
communications, automatic data 
processing and procurement…the 
duration of assignments for officers 
should be increased, and should be as 
responsive to the requirements of the 
job as to the career plan of the officer. 
d) Giving the Program Manager 
directive authority, subject to 
applicable laws and regulations, 
over the contracting officer, and 
clarifying the fact that the contract 
auditor acts in an advisory role. 
(As summarized in Defense Policy 1988:10-13)
 The first recommendation was never acted upon.  In response to the second 
recommendation, President Nixon created the Independent Operational Test and 
Evaluation (IOT&E) organizations in 1970.  These organizations were to help ensure 
weapons deployed to the field worked for the Warfighter.  The Air Force formed the Air 
Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) in 1974 (Benson 1995:18).  
AFOTEC findings were to be used by the DSARC in performing oversight.   
 On the third, forth and fifth recommendations, Secretary Packard laid the 
foundations for the 1971 publication of DoD Directive 5000 series, officially entitled 
“Acquisition for Major Defense Systems” (Acker 1993:169).  This document unified and 
formalized Acquisition policy across the Services.  Secretary Packard required the 
Director, Defense Research and Engineering to conduct “a management review at least 
once during” each MDAP’s life (Acker 1993:167).  Improving OSD management was the 
focus of these reviews.   
 The Commission on Government Procurement.   
 Coinciding with the Fitzhugh Commission, Congress established the Commission 
on Government Procurement in November 1969 to study and recommend methods “to 
promote the economy, efficiency and effectiveness” of procurement by the executive 
branch of the Federal Government (Defense Policy 1988:390).  The 12 member 
commission submitted their report in December 1972.  The recommendations pertinent to 
the Acquisition Process and the Acquisition Oversight Process are listed in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Commission on Government Procurement Recommendations 
3)  Acquisition of Major Systems 1)  General Procurement Considerations:   
a. Finding:
 
  Void in policy leadership and 
responsibility and a fragmented and 
outmoded statutory base.   
a. Finding:  too often the focus has been on 
the system product and not on its 
purpose…adequate attention [is not 
given] to why and new level of 
capability is needed. 
Recommendation: create the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy within the 
Office of Management and Budget. Recommendation: Start new system 
acquisition programs with agency head 
statements of needs and goals. 
b. Finding:  The military procurement is 
govern by the Armed Services 
Procurement Act of 1947, but civilian 
procurement came under the Federal 
Property and Administrative Services act 
of 1949.  There are inconsistencies 
between the two statutes.   
b. Finding:  Funds spent on development of 
alternative systems serve as insurance 
against the possibility of a premature and 
potentially costly choice involving only 
one system. 
Recommendation: Enact legislation to 
eliminate inconsistencies 
Recommendation:  
i)  Create alternative system 
candidates; c. Finding:  There is a burdensome mass 
and maze of regulations   ii) Finance the exploration of 
alternative systems; and Recommendation: Establish a system of 
Government-wide coordinated, and 
uniform procurement regulations under 
the direction of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy. 
iii) Maintain competition between 
contractor exploring alternative 
systems. 
c. Finding:  The cost to maintain 
competition throughout rises 
substantially.  Thus, systems entering 
production and deployment normally do 
so under an evolved monopoly situation, 
with only a single system and contractor 
to meet the need. 
 
2)  Research and Development Acquisition: 
a. Recommendation: Emphasis should be 
placed on basic, innovative research and 
the sharing of new ideas among 
Government agencies.  There should be 
more cooperative industry-Government 
relationship which maximizes the 
creative energies of U.S. suppliers. 
Recommendation: Procuring Agencies 
and Congress should withhold approval 
for full production and use of new 
systems until the need has been 
reconfirmed and system performance has 
been tested and evaluated in an 
environment closely approximating the 
operational conditions. 
b. Finding:  In cost allowability principles, 
the independent research and 
development (IR&D) and bind and 
proposal (B&P) expenditures are in the 
Nation’s best interest to promote 
competition, to advance technology, and 
to foster economic growth 
d. Recommendation: Alleviate the problem 
of management layering and excessive 
staff reviews; Recommendation:  Establish a policy 
recognizing IR&D and B&P efforts as 
necessary costs of doing business. 
e. Recommendation: Strengthen each 
agency’s cost estimating capability 
(As summarized by Defense Policy 1988:13-17)
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 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy was created by statue in 1974 in 
fulfillment of Recommendation 1a.  (Defense Policy 1988:14).  To combat complaints 
that unrealistic cost data was being used for oversight and in fulfillment of 
recommendation 3e, the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) came into 
existence in 1971.  The CAIG was to perform independent cost analysis for the use of 
DSARC (Srull 1998:5).  The other recommendations were addressed by later 
commissions and reports. 
 DoD Organizational Changes.   
 Several organizations changed their names in the 1970s.  The only new agency to 
the Oversight Hierarchy was the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation.  Established 
in 1970, he heads Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (see Figure 8). The Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) position was abolished in 1977 with 
acquisition activities transferred to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
and other responsibilities assigned to the new Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs and Logistics).  The Director of Defense Research and Engineering was 
redesignated Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) by Public law 95-
140 in 1977.  Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) was redesignated four 
times: to Director of Defense Program Analysis and Evaluation in 1973; to Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation) in 1974; to Director of Planning 
and Evaluation in 1976; and lastly to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis 
and Evaluation) in 1977 (US Organization 1998:33-36).   
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 The creation of DSARC and AFSARC increased the number of participants in the 
Acquisition Process.  Program Managers were forced to brief, not only their chain of 
command, but also all the member organizations represented in DSARC and AFSARC.   
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 Air Force Organizational Changes.   
 Acquisition and Logistics were still handled by two different major commands.  
The program management responsibility transfer (PMRT) between AFSC and AFLC was 
ineffective and MDAPs suffered from the discontinuity.  Air Staff established the 
Acquisition Logistics Division in 1976; an oversight organization meant to “ensure that 
reliability, maintainability, and supportability were built into weapon systems” by 
overseeing acquisition programs in AFSC’s product divisions (Benson 1996:19).   
 
Reducing Service Oversight (1977-1988) 
 
 
 President Carter came into office promising a cut in Defense spending.  He cut 
President Ford’s 1978 budget proposal for defense by $3 million.  Instead of decreased 
spending, Defense spending generally increased each year after because of high inflation 
at home and serious challenges internationally.  In December of 1979 the Soviets invaded 
Afghanistan and made it part of its Soviet Bloc.   
In November 1979, Iranian revolutionaries occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran 
and took more than 50 hostages. The planned rescue operation ended in failure 
and the loss of eight U.S. servicemen on 24-25 April 1980. Not until the last day 
of his administration, on 20 January 1981, could President Carter make final 
arrangements for the release of the hostages. (Defense Link 2003: Brown)   
 
Faced with these issues, the Carter Administration concentrated on issues abroad and did 
little to alter the DoD organizational structure or Acquisition Process. 
 President Reagan enjoyed peace and prosperity during his two terms in office.  He 
achieved peace through strength; the DoD budget was increased by 35%; improved 
relations with the Soviet culminated with a treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear 
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missiles; and he maintained a strong military presence in the Persian Gulf to keep oil 
shipping lines open despite hostilities in the Iran-Iraq War (The White House 
2004:Reagan).  Despite these successes, Defense watchdogs were prevalent in the 
1980’s.  Prompted by outside concerns or other factors, Congress formed a bipartisan 80-
member Military Reform Caucus in the late 1970’s.  Its aim was to slash waste and 
discourage abuse of defense dollars.  “Public interest groups such as the Project on 
Military Procurement led by crusader Dina Rasor” and “investigative television programs 
such as CBS’s ‘60 Minutes’ frequently exposed alleged DoD weapons boondoggles” 
(Jones 1999:400).  Allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse were prevalent in popular 
media. 
 The Carlucci Initiatives.   
 The Regan administration recognized a need to study and fix the acquisition 
system.  In 1981, then Secretary of Defense Weinberger ordered his Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Frank C. Carlucci to study all aspects of defense acquisition.  Officially called 
the Acquisition Improvement Task Force, it published 32 initiatives, more commonly 
known as the Carlucci Initiatives (see Table 8).  A majority of these initiatives were 
implemented, adopted, or adapted (Benson 1996:19 and Jones 1999:406). 
 - 53 -
Table 8. Carlucci Initiatives
1) Reaffirm Acquisition Management 
Principles 
17) Decrease DSARC briefing and data 
requirements 
2) Increase use of Preplanned Product 
Improvement 
18) Budget for inflation 
19) Forecast business base conditions 
3) Implement multiyear procurement 20) Improve source selection process 
4) Increase program stability 21) Develop and use standard operation and 
support systems 5) Encourage capital investment to enhance 
productivity 22) Provide more appropriate design-to-
cost-goals 6) Budget to most likely costs 
7) Use economical production rates 23) Implement acquisition process decisions 
8) Assure appropriate contract type 24) Reduce number of DSARC milestones 
9) Improve system support and readiness 25) Submit MENS with Service POM 
10) Reduce administrative costs and time 26) Revise DSARC membership 
11) Budget for technological risk 27) Retain USDR&E as Defense 
Acquisition Executive 12) Provide front-end funding for test 
hardware 28) Raise dollar threshold for DSARC 
review 13) Reduce governmental legislation related 
to acquisition 29) Integrate DSARC and PPBS process 
14) Reduce number of DoD Directives 30) Increase PM visibility of support 
resources 15) Enhance funding flexibility 
31) Improve reliability and support 16) Provide contractor incentives to improve 
reliability. 32) Increase use of competition 
(As summarized by Holbrook 2003:10)
 
 The Grace Commission.   
 In June 1982, President Reagan established the President’s Private Sector Survey 
on Cost Controls (PPSSCC), better known as the Grace Commission.  The 45 members 
representing 21 private sector companies evaluated 36 segments of the Department of 
Defense under the guidance of J. Peter Grace.  President Reagan directed the Grace 
Commission to “identify opportunities for increased efficiency and reduced costs 
achievable by executive action or legislation” (PPSSCC report as quoted by Defense 
Policy 1988:596).  The Grace Commission applauded several of the Carllucci Initiatives 
but maintained that improvements in the Acquisition Process could still be made.  See 
Table 9 for a summary of their findings.   
 - 54 -
Table 9. Grace Commission Recommendations 
1) Improved Organization  6) Common Parts and Standards 
Observation:  Massive duplication of 
effort among the services and OSD 
Recommendation:  Use standardized 
parts in weapons systems and decrease 
the use of military specifications.   Recommendation:  Total consolidation 
of day-to-day acquisition functions at the 
OSD level.   
 
7) Major Weapons System new Starts 
Recommendation:  Limit the number of 
new weapons programs started each year 
and impose stricter entry requirements 
for new systems.   
 
2) Defense Contract Administration 
Consolidation 
Observation:  Wide variations in the 
procedures between the Defense 
Contract Administration Service…and 
the various related components at the 
service level. 
 
8) Estimating Weapons systems Costs 
Recommendation:  Establish procedures 
to ensure more accurate estimates of 
weapons cost in order to permit better 
planning and reduce cost overruns.   
Recommendation:  Consolidate all 
contract administration at the OSD-level.
  
3) Regulatory Constraints 9) Instability of the Weapons Acquisition 
Process Observation:  The Department of 
Defense acquisition of weapons systems 
operates under a complex regulatory 
system. 
Recommendation:  The DoD should 
commit to a stable 5-year spending plan 
for the acquisition of weapons systems at 
economical production rates Recommendation:  Defense Acquisition 
Regulations (DAR) should be replaced 
with general guidelines for DoD 
procurement actions.   
 
10) Transfer of Consumable Inventory Items
Observation:  DLA has proven its ability 
to manage successfully consumable 
items with statistically superior results 
over services. 
 
4) Independent Research and Development 
Costs 
Observation:  The DoD reimbursement 
policy for independent research and 
development (IR&D) costs involves an 
elaborate and time-consuming technical 
review process. 
Recommendation:  Of the 1.2 million 
inventories being managed by the 
Services, 900,000 should be transferred 
to DLA. 
 
Recommendation:  Eliminate technical 
review and group IR&D under overhead 
costs. 
11) Implementation of OMB Circular A-76 
Recommendation:  Remove various 
legislative requirements that serve to 
restrict DoD’s implementation of the A-
76 program.  Thereby outsource 
commercial functions. 
 
5) Department of Defense Laboratories 
Recommendation:  Improve data 
exchange,…reduce duplication, and 
DoD laboratories should phase out their 
involvement in the late stages of the 
development cycle. 
(Summarized from Defense Policy 1988:17-20)
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 The Packard Commission.  
 On 15 July 1985, President Reagan established the President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, more commonly known as the Packard 
Commission after its chairman David Packard.  Table 10 summarizes the main points.  
President Regan began to implement the Packard Commission recommendations prior to 
the Commission’s final report.  On 1 April 1986, President Regan issued National 
Security Decision Directive 219 which established an Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition) “to set policy for and oversee program management through the new 
Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) and a number of high level committees with 
interlocking membership” (Benson 1996:21).  He became the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE).  The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) replaced DSARC in its 
responsibilities.  The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established 
within the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to define requirements and select programs 
for development.  The Packard Commission and the resultant reform measures were seen 
as managerial fixes to political problem woven into the organization itself.   
In organizational politics terms, the Packard reforms—in conjunction with other 
events and developments of the time—produced a net decline in OSD’s capacity 
to influence the…process. (Jones 1999:403) 
 
In the first Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney would order the 
implementation, in whole or in part, all the Packard recommendations through such 
initiatives as the Defense Management Review.   
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Table 10. Packard Commission Recommendations 
Institutionalize, expand, and link a series 
of critical determinations within the 
Executive Branch and Congress.   
3) The SAE appoints Program Executive 
Officers (PEO), each responsible for a 
set number of acquisition programs. 
4) Program managers are responsible to the 
respective PEO and report only to him 
on program matters. 
1) National Security Council (NSC) issues 
national security objectives. 
2) President issues a five-year budget with 
input from NSC and the Office of 
Management and Budget. 
5) All federal statues governing 
procurement should be recoded into a 
single procurement statue. 3) Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS) prepares a military strategy and 
budget priorities 
6) Establish business-related education and 
experience criteria for senior-level 
acquisition personnel. 4) Department of Defense (DoD) generates 
a five year defense plan and a two-year 
defense budget based on budget level 
and programs chosen by the President. 
7) Establish the Joint Requirements and 
Management Board (JRMB) co-chaired 
by the CJCS and the USD(A) to define 
requirements and select programs for 
development. 
5) The President presents the budget to 
congress based on national strategy and 
operational concepts. 8) Use a greater number of “off the shelf” 
items.  
9) Increase use of prototypes Military Organization and Command 
10) Operational testing should be completed 
prior to high-rate production. 
1) Make CJCS principal uniformed military 
advisor to the President, NSC, and 
Secretary of Defense. 11) Increase use of commercial-style 
competition. 2) Joint Staff and the office of JCS are 
exclusively directed by the CJCS. 12) DoD should fully institutionalize 
“baselining” 3) Correspondence to the Commanders-in-
Chief of the Unified and Specified 
Commands (CINCs) goes through the 
CJCS. 
13) Greater use of multi-year procurement 
14) Reduce requirements for Data rights 
 
Government-Industry Accountability 4) Create a Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. 1) Aggressively enforce federal civil and 
criminal laws governing defense 
acquisition. 
5) Reduce Military Headquarters  
6) Establish a single unified command to 
integrate global transportation. 2) Defense contractors should promulgate 
and vigilantly enforce codes of ethics 
and develop internal controls to monitor 
themselves. 
 
Acquisition Organization and Procedures 
1) Create the position of Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)) as the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
3) DoD should develop specific ethics 
guidance on matters of DoD acquisition 
and train personnel on such matters. 2) Services should have similar executives.  
They will act as Service Acquisition 
Executives (SAE). 
4) Oversight of defense contractors must be 
better coordinated among the various 
DoD agencies. 
5) USD(A) should establish audit policies 
and foster contractor self-governance. 
(Summarized from PBRC:1986:xvi-xxx)
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 Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.   
 On 1 October 1986, President Reagan signed into Public Law 99-433, the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  Such sweeping 
changes had not been accomplished since the Reorganization Act of 1958.  The acts 
major provisions implemented many of the recommendations of the Packard 
Commission.   
1) In this act the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was strengthened in a manner 
suggested by the Packard Commission (Benson 1996:21).  Command 
relationships were clarified and streamlined.  No longer were Service Secretaries 
included in the command chain.   
 
As outlined in the conference report to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the law 
intends generally for the Secretary to have ‘sole and ultimate power within 
the Department of Defense on any matter on which the Secretary chooses 
to act,’ giving him broad authority to reorganize DoD activities without 
changing statutory arrangements (Donley 1995:91-92) 
 
2) The Act “emphasized that experience in the joint (inter-Service) Unified 
Commands and other joint organizations were more important to an officer’s 
career advancement than assignments within one’s own Service” (Jones 
1999:408).  Joint duty was given higher accord when the Act made Joint Duty 
necessary to qualify as a senior general or flag officer.   
 
3) The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) was created to assist in preparing 
written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans and 
in reviewing such plans.  He was also invited to be a member of DAB.   
 
4) Service headquarter staffs were to be reduced.  The Services were ordered to 
eliminate panels that performed duties redundant to DoD organizations (Jones 
1999:408).  For this reason the AFSARC was later disestablished.   
 
The primary purpose of the Act was to strengthen civilian control over the military and 
reduce layering and duplication within the head quarters by designating a single office 
within the Secretariat for Acquisition.  The General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated 
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the DoD reorganization and found civilian powers strengthened but Acquisition expertise 
within the secretariat lacking.  In particular, “military officers dominate the leadership 
positions in acquisition secretariat” of the Air Force (GAO Acq Reform 1991:2).  The 
GAO report concludes that a lack of acquisition expertise in the secretariat and the 
dominance of uniformed personnel within the acquisition secretariat weaken civilian 
power over Air Force Acquisition. 
 Organizational Changes.   
 On July 1, 1986, the title, the Undersecretary of Defense (Research and 
Engineering), was changed to Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition).  The position of 
Director for OT&E was established in September 1983; he is to report directly to the 
Secretary of Defense (U.S. Organization 1998:38).  The Air Force merged the positions 
and staffs of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition with 
the Assistant Secretary of Air Force (Research, Development, and Acquisition) to form 
the office of the new Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition); he would 
become the designated Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) for MDAPs.  At first, the 
Air Force Program Executive Officers (PEOs) were dual hated as Product Center 
Commanders.  The resulting oversight model is depicted in Figure 9. 
 Those granted the power to cancel, delay, or approve an MDAP are depicted in 
Figure 9 with double outlines.  Historically, personnel and organizations outside the PM, 
PEO, CAE, and DAE have been known to exercise the same powers.  The acquisition 
culture expected the PMs to defer to the other organizations depicted in Figure 9 before 
meeting an official DAB.  It was a method to share responsibility and gain consensus 
within DoD (Jones 1999:402). 
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Streamlining (1988-2003) 
 
 
 In 1988, George Herbert Walker Bush was elected President.  Diplomatically he 
succeeded on many fronts:  on 9 November 1989 the Berlin Wall was torn down and the 
Soviet administration of Russia collapsed in 1990 putting an end to the Cold War.  
Militarily he gained popular victories.  He sent troops into Panama to overthrow General 
Manuel Noriega by arresting him for drug trafficking thereby protecting the Americans 
who lived there and the canal for international travel.   He sent troops to keep the peace 
in the war-torn Bosnia.  Most notably he thwarted Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s 
attempts to annex Kuwait in a combination of military actions collectively known as the 
Persian Gulf War in 1991 (White House 2004:Bush).   
 Defense Management Review of 1989.   
 In July 1989, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney chartered the Defense 
Management Review (DMR) Committee to identify ways of trimming expenses within 
the DoD and implement the Packard Commission’s Recommendations fully (Elliot 
1991:1).  Common support functions such as defense acquisition were consolidated 
through Defense Management Review Decisions.  As a result of the DMR more authority 
migrating to OSD officials, and responsibilities for day-to-day execution split between 
newly created defense agencies combined to further diminished military departments.  
The DMR 
included 250 separate decisions to implement consolidations; improve 
information systems, enhance management, and employ better business practices.  
These decisions were expected to yield anywhere from $62 billion to $71 billion 
in savings over a 5-year period and DoD’s budget were reduced up-front to 
capture these savings.  (GAO Defense Management 1998:3.2) 
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The defense budget was cut drastically in anticipation of savings from reduced 
infrastructure.  Often realized savings were less then estimated or realized slower then 
anticipated (GAO Defense Management 1998:3.2).   
 DMR greatly reduced the chain of command between the PM and the SAE.  
Though the workforce between a PM and the SAE had decreased, the workforce between 
the SAE and the DAE had not.  The DAB include the over 20 appointed officials 
(USD(A&T) Report 1995:10).  Through DMR Decisions PMs were no longer required to 
formally brief major command personnel.  Formal briefings to OSD personnel were also 
greatly reduced.  PMs were slow to take advantage of reporting freedoms since program 
success often relied on keeping OSD and Major Commands informed.  (GAO 
Acquisition Reform 1991:3-5) 
 Other then procedural and organizational changes, DMR decisions also revamped 
the entire acquisition career field.  In 12 June 1989, a DMR decision “had directed the 
services to correct deficiencies in the training and development of personnel involved in 
acquisition by developing plans for a dedicated corps of officers to serve as acquisition 
specialists” (Benson 1996:23).  Greater changes to the Acquisition career field were 
made into law by Congress with the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. 
 Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act of 1990. 
 GAO noted that “while some program managers possessed substantial experience 
and training, many did not” (GAO Acquisition Reform 1991:7).  The same was true for 
OSD and other supporting Acquisition personnel.  In 1990 Congress formalized 
requirements for acquisition professionals with the passage of the Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act.  Within the Act were new education, training, and 
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experience requirements.  Also included was the following provision calling for more 
civilians in the Acquisition workforce.   
The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the acquisition workforce is managed 
such that, for each fiscal year from October 1, 1991, through September 30, 1996, 
there is a substantial increase in the proportion of civilians (as compared to armed 
forces personnel) serving in critical acquisition positions in general, in program 
manager positions, and in division head positions over the proportion of civilians 
(as compared to armed forces personnel) in such positions on October 1, 1990. 
(EC 2004: title 2 subsection 1721) 
 
The acquisition community hierarchy was further supported by this act.  This act partially 
fulfilled the Packard Commission’s recommendation for a more permanent Acquisition 
Workforce unlike the uniformed military who would move every two to four years.  
 Defense Science Board Report on Defense Acquisition Reform. 
 The Defense Science Board had existed as an advisory panel since 1954 and the 
creation of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology).  In 1993 
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney asked the Defense Science Board (DSB) to advise 
him on the best way to “acquire adequate defense capability, with state-of-the-art 
technologies and industrial processes, at affordable prices, in the quantities needed” 
(DSB 1993:i).  DSB published four reports.  Phase one came out in 1993 emphasizing the 
need to adopt commercial practices into Defense Acquisition.  Phase two came out in 
1994 identifying defense industry segments for further commercialization, identified 
major commands for increased responsibility in requirement generation, and identified 
barriers to the implementation of commercial practices.  Phase three came out in 1996 
evaluating the possibility of extending commercial practices into the R&D phase of the 
Acquisition Process (see Table 11).  Phase four came out in 1999 reporting on the metrics 
the DoD could establish to measure its implementation of Acquisition Reform initiatives.   
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Table 11. Defense Science Board Task Force Recommendations 
Phase I Recommendations Phase II Recommendations Phase III Recommendations 
• Broaden procurement of 
commercial products 
• Pilot Industries should 
include military jet 
engines , software, and 
microelectronics. 
• DoD model Acquisition 
Process on the American 
free-market system  • Increase the use of 
simplified procurement 
procedures … raises the 
threshold to $100,000. 
• R&D programs should 
be phased to halve the 
average time to field a 
usable major system. 
• Increased CINC 
Capabilities in 
USACOM and 
CENTCOM for 
evaluating new 
technologies and 
developing joint user 
needs in a more 
flexible requirement 
process. 
• Reduce reliance on cost 
or pricing data. • Promote Integrated 
Product Teams 
composed of contractors, 
users, and supplier 
agencies to provide the 
best solutions within 
specific schedule and 
price constraints.  
• Select industries for 
pilots to used 
commercial practices to 
acquire goods and 
services. 
• Select Major Commands 
for greater role in 
requirements definition. 
• The DoD should allow 
contractors to be 
governed by the same 
body of laws and 
practices that cover the 
commercial world 
instead of DoD 
specific ones. 
• Use carefully structured, 
relatively short, fixed 
price/flexible 
performance contracts. 
• Make Annual Plans for 
Commercialization 
• Establish a standing 
outside Review Group • Implement risk-
reduction phase before 
full system development 
• Establish a 
comprehensive 
education, training, 
communications, and 
outreach program for 
government, industry, 
and the public. 
• DoD should encourage 
the use of commercial 
practices and 
specifications. 
• Include contractor’s past 
performance as 
significant factors in 
source selection. 
DSB 1: 1993:iii-iv                       DSB 2:1994:8                           DSB 3:1996:i-ii 
 
 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. 
 On 5 January 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results 
Act.  Its purpose was “to provide for the establishment of strategic planning and 
performance measurement in the Federal Government” and “improve internal 
management of the Federal Government” (USC 2004).  To this end, the GPO has 
reported annually on the DoD’s performance starting in fiscal year 2000.  Of the five 
selected outcomes one directly measures the performance of the Acquisition Community, 
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that “the U.S. maintains technological superiority in key war-fighting capabilities”  
(GAO DoD 2001:1).  GAO found that:  
some of the performance goals underlying measures—such as procurement 
spending and defense technology objectives—do not provide a direct link toward 
meeting the goal [and that the] DoD’s performance report does not reflect 
concerns raised within the Department about the adequacy of its strategy and the 
timely introduction of new technologies to operation forces.  (GAO DoD 2001:2) 
 
The lesson to be learned here is that the Acquisition Process is complicated, interrelated, 
and difficult to measure.   
 Process Action Team on Oversight and Review of 1994. 
 The Clinton Administration chartered a process action team to “…develop within 
90 days a comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight and review process for systems 
acquisition, in both the Components and OSD, to make it more effective and efficient, 
while maintaining an appropriate level of oversight” (PAT 1994:i).  The 
recommendations of the PAT team are depicted in Table 12.  President Clinton 
implemented several of their recommendations in a series of executive decisions. 
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Table 12. Process Action Team Recommendations 
• Reduce number of milestones; Forge a 
Three-Milestone Process. 
• Trim Milestone Decision Documents 
and Activities.  
• Collapse the number of formal pre-
milestone meetings to one. 
• Institutionalize Integrated Product 
Teams to Do Oversight and Review. 
• Align program accountability and 
reporting for all acquisition programs, 
not just the MDAPs. 
• Centralize the affordability decision 
by placing it into the Warfighter’s 
hands. 
• Consolidate the oversight and review 
process for joint programs and those 
programs requiring substantial inter-
service harmonizing. 
• Establish more stringent experience 
criteria for ACAT I Program Managers 
and Deputy Program Managers 
• Stabilize MDAP Program manager 
tenure from program initiation until start 
of production  
• Establish a Career Civilian Deputy for 
the Defense Acquisition Executive and 
each Component Acquisition Executive. 
• Revitalize the Acquisition Program 
Baseline as the major program control 
tool thereby eliminating need for other 
documents. 
• Institutionalize a summit process for 
ACAT I Programs 
• Apply reengineering principles to 
contractor oversight. 
(Summarized from the Process Action Team Report 1994:viii-xi) 
 
 National Performance Review. 
 With the end of the Cold War, many felt that the DoD funding should be reduced, 
the national debt paid down, and other social programs prosper from the peace dividend.  
Further budget cuts and workforce downsizing was inevitable.  To better streamline the 
DoD Acquisition Process President Clinton initiated the National Performance Review.  
It offered the following initiatives: streamlining the Army Corps of Engineers, creating 
incentives to generate revenues, establishing a unified budget, implementing a 
productivity-enhancing capital investment fund, and reducing some National Guard and 
Reserve costs.  As part of the National performance Review President Clinton signed into 
law the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act on 19 October 1994.  Its purpose was to 
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“overhaul the cumbersome and complex procurement system of the federal government” 
(DSMB 2004).  Some highlights are listed in Table 12.   
• Eliminated most paperwork for acquisitions below $100,000 within the Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold (SAT). 
• Allowed direct “micropurchases” of items below $2,500 without competitive quotations 
or compliance with Buy American Act and certain small business requirements. 
• Promotes the acquisition of commercially available items 
• Establishing a Government –wide Federally Acquisition Computer Network (FACNET) 
to make electronically available, MDAP materials 
• Established a six year limitation period for filing claims under the Contact Disputes Act 
(CDA) and increased dollar thresholds for claim certification and the accelerated and 
small claims procedures. 
• Reserved acquisitions over $2,500 but under $100,000 for small business concerns. 
• Expanded the Small Disadvantaged Business set-aside program to include civilian agency 
procurements. 
• Established new 5% contracting Goal for women-owned small businesses. 
• Preserved private contractors’ ability to file bid protests in the U.S. District Courts and 
authorizing federal district courts to obtain advisory opinions from board of contract 
appeals. 
• Improved bid protest and contract administrations procedures. 
• Repealed that part of the Walsh-Healey Act requiring an offeror to certify that it is a 
regular dealer or manufacturer. 
• Requiring evaluation of past performance before contract award. 
• Raising the Truth in Negotiation Act (TINA) threshold for requiring certified cost or 
pricing data to a uniform $500,000 for both civilian agencies and DoD procurements. 
Table 13. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) Highlights 
(Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act as summarized by DSMB 2004) 
 
 Organizational Changes.   
 At the DoD level, best practices were being identified and implemented.  In 1995, 
Secretary of Defense William Perry directed the Department of Defense to employ the 
use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT).  The “IPT concept for oversight…is intended to 
replace the current sequential process” that often times modify review documents greatly 
or reject the product (USD(A&T) Report 1995:3).  The Overarching IPTs, composed of 
political appointees and its subordinate Working IPTs are used as advisors to the DAB.  
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Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was abolished in 1993 when 
acquisition activities were transferred to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology.   
 With the passage of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 MDAPs the fell under the 
Information Technology (IT) category were given a separate DAB, one called the 
Information Technology Acquisition Board (ITAB) and the DAE duties were transferred 
to the Under Secretary of Defense (Information Technology).  The Act stated that the 
level of expertise necessary to perform oversight of this highly technical field required a 
different skill set then that provided by the DAB or the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition). 
 At the Air Force level Deputy Assistant Secretary Darleen Druyun issued a series 
of reform measures known as “Lightening Bolt” initiatives.  They are in brief form: 
1) Centrally scrub all major requests for proposals 
2) Create a standing acquisition strategy panel 
3) Develop a new SPO manpower standard based on SAR programs 
4) Cancel all AFMC center acquisition policies 
5) Reinvent the AFSARC process using IPTs 
6) Improve the consideration of past performance in making source selections 
7) Consolidate documents required for milestone decision into a single acquisition 
management plan. 
8) Incorporate acquisition reform into the PEO and DAC portfolios. 
9) Enhance workforce training and education.  
10) Cut contract award time in half. 
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11) Adopt business processes in laboratories.  (Benson 1996:24) 
Increased PEO responsibilities forced the Air Staff to “establish a separate PEO structure 
in the Pentagon on 15 February 1990” (Benson 1996: 21).  Product Center Commanders 
gave 37 MDAPs to the PEOs but continue to give oversight to lesser programs (mainly 
programs in Logistics and Communications).  The new PEO structure absorbed AFSC 
acquisition operations and in 1991, AFSC and AFLC were merged together into the Air 
Force Material Command (AFMC).  The new Air Force Material Command implemented 
the concept of integrated weapons system management (IWSM).  With one command in 
charge of research, development, development tests and evaluation, acquisition, and 
logistics AFMC could assign one PM to a MDAP and eliminate the need for program 
management responsibility transfers (PMRT) (Benson 1996:22).  The resulting oversight 
construct is as follows. 
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Secretary of Defense 
 
 
Ongoing Pilot Studies
In an effort to reduce the cost of oversight, the Bush Administration has enabled 
three experimental oversight processes other then the current DoD 5000 series.  The DoD 
5000 series is the regulation that defines the boundaries of the Acquisition Process; it is 
the “box” the pilot study groups are looking to reengineer.  The Information Technology 
MDAPs navigate through the “box” in the virtual realm.  Instead of holding meetings 
within the Pentagon, upper management will evaluate MDAPs over the Internet, video 
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teleconference meetings, or via e-mail.  The Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has 
taken their MDAPs through a smaller “box.”  Instead of holding meetings at the 
Pentagon, meetings are held in-house with a body of non-stakeholders.  The team
provides a recommendation to the AFSPC Commander at key decision points.  The
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is creating a new “box” that entails the use of progr
experts instead of the OSD personnel.  For additional information see Neal 2004, 
Rousseau 2004, and DeReus 2004. 
 
 
 
am 
ummaryS  
the past five decades, the Air Force has made strides in organizing and 
anagi
ed 
el.  
 
es and 
fense 
 
 For 
m ng MDAPs as efficiently and effectively as possible.  It inherited a heavily 
encumbered process from the Army; one that entailed the use of commercially own
labs and Army owned depots.  Air Material Command was hard pressed to separate 
Army assets from Air Force assets in their inventories, logistics support, and personn
Above the Air Force, the newly appointed Secretary of Defense had his hands tied by 
statute and too small of a staff to handle the chore of eradicating duplicate processes.  A
series of law changes greatly centralized power at the Secretary of Defense level, 
changing his role from arbitrator between the services to the manager of the servic
sole defense advisor to the President.  Secretary McNamara took advantage of these new 
powers over budget and acquisition to liquidate duplication between the services.   
 Acquisition went from service unique to a more unified process.  Several de
agencies were created to facilitate a more unified acquisition process.  When reports 
alleging Defense fraud, waste, and abuse surfaced, emphasis was placed on increasing
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quality controls through the use of testing, longer development phases, and service 
independent agencies (i.e. Cost Analysis Improvement Group).   
 The burden of numerous regulations and statues, tedious contractual devices, and 
rmal 
 
 
e 
n from 
fo reporting requirements caused PMs and contractors to plead for relief.  Such relief 
was granted; regulations and statues were codified and reduced.  The DoD has of late 
been fashioning itself like a commercial business.  Using corporations as a benchmark,
DoD has tried to reduce the cost of Acquisition in both time and money, as well as 
increase the quality of DoD’s inventory.  The Acquisition career path required more
training, education, and experience.  The number of milestones in the MDAP lifecycl
was reduced from five to three.  The future points at greater flexibilities in oversight 
constructs.  The future may hold several oversight hierarchies, each tailored to a 
particular technology.  Innovators would do well to study past constructs and lear
history. 
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III. Methodology and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 Per the United States Constitution, the role of the military has been to “provide 
for the common defense.”  To support this mission, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Acquisition Community has been able to develop and acquire the best weapons and 
support systems in the world.  Since its inception, the DoD have employed various forms 
of oversight to manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP).  Numerous 
studies have been performed over four decades, assessing the status of the Acquisition 
Process.  Therefore it follows, that these studies are the “report card” of the 
corresponding Acquisition Oversight Process.  Studious examination of these reports has 
revealed supportive evidence or a lack of evidence that a particular construct does not 
meet eight goals outlined below. 
 The actors in the Acquisition Oversight Process and studies performed on them 
were introduced in Chapter 2.  This chapter identifies the job performance areas or work 
criteria.  This will form the basis of comparison between the constructs, one from each 
decade.   
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Criteria of Acquisition Oversight 
 
 
 The Acquisition Community’s overall task is to acquire systems for the armed 
services in the most efficient manner.  Those involved in the Acquisition Oversight 
Process have a duty to ensure an appropriate level of review is performed on MDAPs 
(PAT 1994:iv).  The following are objectives that the Acquisition Oversight Process 
should achieve as identified by the 1994 Oversight and Review Process Action Team. 
1) Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.  
 
2) Demand accountability by matching managerial authority with responsibility 
 
3) Promote flexibility and encourage innovation  
 
4) Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder. 
 
5) Actively promote program stability. 
 
6) Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs. 
 
7) Emulate the best practices of successful commercial companies and successful 
Government ventures. 
 
8) Preserve the public trust.  (PAT 1994:iv-v) 
 
Of the eight only seven are being assessed; a more thorough explanation follows. 
 
 Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.   
 While requirements generation is not the focus of this thesis, it drives the 
acquisition process.  The desired outcome of this objective has two parts:  1) the quality 
of the products being fielded, and 2) how quickly new capabilities become available.  
Ideally, new capabilities will be available to Warfighters before a shortcoming in relation 
to opposing forces is realized.  The newest technology was only as good as its ability to 
perform as advertised.  The Warfighter must trust the equipment or they will abandon it 
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and use what they are familiar with.  Reports on weapons deployed to the field of war 
and other military actions detail whether the Acquisition Process and its Oversight 
process accomplished this objective. 
 Matching managerial authority with responsibility.   
 Role definition is key to this objective.  The personnel performing oversight 
activities receive their job descriptions from laws and regulations governing the 
Acquisition Process.  The emphasis of this objective is has three sides: 1) the clarity of 
such role definition, 2) the ability of personnel to play their role without external 
interference, and 3) whether decisions are made at the lowest level possible.  Several 
commission reports evaluate the managerial roles played by key Department persons.   
 Promote flexibility and encourage innovation.  
 To accomplish this objective, the Program Manager should be allowed, within 
reason, to diverge from the set Acquisition Process, that is to tailor the Acquisition 
Process depending upon such factors as the inherent program risk and complexity, the 
program manager’s experience, the program’s history, total dollar value, Congressional 
interest and similar factors.   
 Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.   
 A reporting structure can serve to drive participants apart or it can encourage 
teamwork.  Setting stakeholders at cross purposes could jeopardize an MDAP progress.  
Committee reports have commented on the harmony within the Acquisition Process.  
Noted disharmony would signal that teamwork is not fostered in the process. 
 Actively promote program stability.   
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 Changes of requirements, in budgets, in contracting vehicles, and in the economy 
or the beginnings of war are the leading factors in program disruptions.  The Oversight 
process could disrupt a program by delaying decision or undoing decisions.  It is difficult 
to estimate the value of such disruptions therefore this objective is subjective to the 
beholder and can not be a basis of judging between constructs. 
 Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.   
 The net-added-value of the Acquisition Oversight Process should be one where 
the time, dollar, manpower, and opportunity costs of the process are clearly outweighed 
by the added value to the decision maker.   The cost of Acquisition Oversight has been 
compared to the satisfactory roll out of military systems in past. 
 Emulate the best practices.  
 The Acquisition Oversight Process evolved during wartime into a fitful 
amalgamation of expedient methods.  Committees have compared the Department against 
the best in industry and in government.  Favorable reports are rare. 
 Preserve the public trust.   
 The Secretary of Defense, the President, the Congress, and the taxpayer should 
have confidence that the oversight and review process is helping provide appropriate 
stewardship of the public monies.  Avenues should be available to reassure these 
customers that the process is working.   
 
 
Data Source 
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 Several major commissions studied the Department of Defense over the decades 
of its existence (see Table 10).  With in the text of the reports published by these groups 
are comments about the performance of the oversight process of its time.  For instance, 
the First Hoover Commission, Rockefeller Committee and the Second Hoover 
Commission shall be investigated for clues on the abilities of the Acquisition Oversight 
Hierarchy of 1949.  If the reports do not contain clues, GAO reports and historian 
comments are used to assess the capabilities of the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy to 
accomplish the seven objectives.  Generally Commission Reports, GAO reports and 
historians often point out areas requiring further improvement rather then areas that are 
sound.  Therefore the data collected is used as evidence to support a construct is not able 
to meet an objective.   
 
Table 1.  Major Commissions on Defense Acquisition Process 
Date Major Commission 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
1949 First Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch  
1953 Rockefeller Committee 
1955 Second Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive  
            Branch 
1970 Fitzhugh Commission / Blue Ribbon Defense Panel 
1972 Commission on Government Procurement 
1983 Grace Commission / President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls 
1986 Packard Commission / President’s Blue Ribbon Defense Commission 
1994 Process Action Team on Oversight and Review 
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1949 Oversight 
 
 
With the Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 the Secretary of Defense 
was created.  The resulting Acquisition Oversight Process is depicted in Figure 4.   
Secretary of Defense 
Advisors:   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Secretary of the Air Force OSD Munitions Board,  
OSD R&D Board 
 
Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.   
On this objective the commission studies were silent.  Air Force Historian 
Lawrence Benson notes that the Air Force primarily relied on European agencies to 
perform research, develop and in some case to produce weapon systems (Benson 
1996:10).  Despite budget cuts, the Air Force was able to reach the supersonic age with 
the introduction of Lockheed’s F-80, the Republic’s F-84, and the North American made 
F-86.  These planes were instrumental in the Korean War (McNaugher 1989:30).  The 
World War II aircraft were driven by propellers and were no match for the Russian made 
Air Material Command
Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Material 
Engineering Divisions 
Air Force Chief of Staff 
Material Divisions 
Air Force Procurement Officers Air Force Procurement Officers 
Figure 5: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1949 
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MiG.  The majority opinion is that the 1949 construct did provide Warfighters with 
needed technologies in time to meet wartime aggressions.  Therefore there is a lack o
evidence to support the Warfighter needs objective not being met.   
Matching managerial authority with responsibility.   
f 
ecutive Branch found 
“contin
n 
d on 
f 
ide 
left 
with only the most general supervisory powers over policies, operations, and 
ller Committee on Department of Defense Organization found that 
Service
t 
The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Ex
ued disharmony and lack of unified planning” (National Security Organization 
Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:29).  In their report to Congress, the Commissio
found that both the President and the Secretary of Defense was severely limited by 
statutes on the membership of key Boards, on the organization of the Department, an
the budget of the Services.  Such limits on authority allowed the Services to function as a 
federation rather than as a unified defense department.  The Munitions Board and the 
Research and Development Boards were both advisors to the President and Secretary o
Defense, lacking the authority to direct unified acquisitions.  Some units such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers had direct authority from Congress and were therefore outs
the powers of the president, Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army.   
Statutory authority is delegated to subordinate units, the department head is 
budgets.  In such cases, the department head cannot enforce consistent policies 
and obtain the necessary efficiency and economy.  Nor can he be held strictly 
accountable since he lacks authority to carry out the mandates of determined 
policy (National Security Organization Report quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:31).   
 
The Rockefe
 Secretaries were often omitted from military affairs and left with those of 
political, economic, and industrial affairs.  There was a dual chain of command tha
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muddied the line of responsibilities from the Secretary of Defense to the Military chiefs.  
Further, they found  
a long record of challenges based on a legalistic argument that the phrase in the 
national Security Act which requires that the three military departments be 
‘separately administered’ is a limitation on the authority of the Secretary of 
Defense (Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History 
1978:129).   
 
The Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government noted there is “vagueness in the assignment of responsibility for support 
activities between the military Chiefs of Staff and the civilian executives” (Business 
Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:61).    In the 
management vacuum “the bureaus of the Navy and the technical services of the Army 
have enjoyed a high degree of autonomy” (Business Organization of the Department of 
Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:62).  There is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition 
Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. 
The First Hoover Commission did not address this objective.  The Rockefeller 
Committee on Department of Defense Organization found that the Research and 
Development board was “handicapped in carrying out its functions by the rigidity of its 
membership and the complicated administrative mechanism inherent in the board-type 
structure” (Report of the Rockefeller Committee as quoted by OSD History 1978:138).  
The Munitions Board suffered from the same rigidity.  The Second Hoover Commission 
notes that the acquisition bureaus were mostly autonomous, that services had little 
control over them during peace, and that military oversight over the bureaus were 
growing stronger (Business Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by 
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Defense Policy 1988:68).  Below the OSD the Services strove to protect themselves from 
Congressional Inquires and Judicial suits brought forth mostly by dissatisfied contractors.  
The trend in Acquisition Contracting was towards inflexible contracts with elaborate 
specifications and extensive testing that could take up to two years.  Such practices 
would serve as a legal defense against law suits or inquires (McNaugher 1989:21).  There 
is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.   
 The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch found 
disharmony in the Department made apparent by the overt Service rivalries.  “There is a 
lack of close working relationships among such important elements as the Research and 
Development Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (National Security Organization 
Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:30).  Service secretaries had statutory “authority 
to resist the supervision of the Secretary of Defense in budgetary matters” (National 
Security Organization Report quoted by Defense Policy 1988:31).  The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS), as a unit reported to the President and the Secretary of Defense, as individual 
Service Chiefs they reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and individual 
Service Secretaries.  By design, the Service Chiefs is more apt to curry to the Service 
Secretary who is his direct supervisor then to answer the needs of the Department.  The 
JCS activities were “not well-coordinated with intra [Departmental] operations, or with 
the policy work of the Cabinet councils” (National Security Organization Report quoted 
by Defense Policy 1988:30-32).   
 The Rockefeller Committee on Department of Defense Organization found the 
dual role performed by the Joint Chiefs were noted as and invitation to Service 
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competition or rivalries.  They emphasized the need to hold joint meetings, not just with 
Service Chiefs but also with Service Secretaries, and between working-level staff 
members within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  Such meetings would 
serve to improve cooperation, harmonize functions, and enable the staffers to coordinate 
their thinking with that of the Secretary of Defense (OSD History 1978:128-149) 
 The Second Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the 
Government noted four obstacles impeding teamwork:   
1) decisions and information does not flow freely from the JCS to the Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense; 
 
2) “the assignment of responsibilities among members of [OSD] impedes 
effective coordination;”  
 
3) “the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretaries in the military departments 
differ significantly in nature and scope—a condition which complicates 
coordination and understanding between each department and the [OSD] and 
among the departments themselves;”  
 
4) “responsibility for the management of support activities is not clearly defined 
between the principal military and the principal civilian executives” (Business 
Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:61-62). 
 
There is evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this 
objective. 
 Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs.   
 The First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch were 
conscious of the cost of maintaining a large standing military stating that the huge 
military budget should “be used with efficiency, and that costs shall be commensurate 
with actual needs without damaging or destroying our national economy.”  Their focus 
was on holding the military accountable but the Commission had little insight into the 
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specific cost of oversight and review (National Security Organization Report quoted by 
Defense Policy 1988:28).  The Rockefeller Committee had a similar prospective stating 
that “The American people will support the President and the Secretary of Defense in 
establishing an organization of the Department of Defense which is capable of providing 
the nation with maximum security at minimum cost and without danger to our free 
institutions, based on the fundamental principle of civilian control of the Military 
Establishment” (OSD History 1978:128).  The Second Hoover Commission did not 
comment on this objective.  There is a lack of evidence that the 1947 Acquisition 
Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Emulate the best practices  
 The First Hoover Commission Organization stated that there are three principles 
that underlie good Government management: “efficiency, economy, and clear 
accountability to the Congress and the people.”  The Commission goes on to say that 
“these principles have been repeatedly violated” (National Security Organization Report 
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:32).  Similarly the Rockefeller Committee stated that best 
organization have achieved four objectives: 1) clear line of authority 2) Clear roles and 
mission for the Services 3) Planning based on the most effective use of modern scientific 
and industrial resources and 4) Maximum economies (i.e. cost controls) without injuring 
military strength.  It goes on to say that “the Department of Defense cannot now attain 
these four objectives in full” (OSD History 1978:128).  The Second Hoover Commission 
stated simply that the weaknesses of the oversight “are due to the expansion of the 
military services…these faulty systems are encumbered by traditions…arise from static 
laws from other days which create roadblocks to effective improvement” (Business 
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Organization of the Department of Defense quoted by Defense Policy 1988:51).  There is 
evidence that the 1947 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Preserve the public trust.   
 The First Hoover Commission Organization stated the need for accountability in 
order to preserve the public trust but did not say the military had lost said trust.  The 
Rockefeller Committee similarly stated that the American people trust and support the 
President in reorganizing the military especially with the state of world affairs (i.e. the 
invasion of Korea by Communist China).  The Second Hoover Commission Organization 
made no comment on public trust.  There is a lack of evidence that the 1947 Acquisition 
Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
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1964 Oversight  
 
 
 The Korean War ended in 1953 and the Vietnam War was just beginning just as 
President Eisenhower was ending his second term in office.  The Acquisition Oversight 
Structure in 1964 is the end result of the 1949 amendment to the National Security Act, 
Reorganization plan number 6 of 1953, Reorganization Acts of 1958 and Secretary 
McNamara’s influences. See Figure 8. 
Secretary of Defense 
 
Program Managers  
Air Force Systems 
Command Air Force Logistics 
Command  
Product Divisions 
Logistic Centers 
Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Systems and Logistics 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and 
Assistant Secretary of 
Instillations and Logistics
Director , Defense Research 
and Engineering. 
JCS 
Figure 8: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1964 
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 Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it.  
 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel the practice of firm-fixed price contracts, total 
package procurement, and Production/Development concurrency led to ill-conceived 
systems that often included out-dated technologies.  According to the Panel these factors 
inhibits the “developer’s capability to achieve the best product” (Report by the Blue 
Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:220).  As a consequence, 
Warfighters were receiving a product that partially met needs, was better then the system 
it replaced but had flaws requiring several interim fixes.  “In a sample of 22 weapon 
systems deployed to Southeast Asia [Vietnam] from 1965-1970, DoD studies found all 
but one had suffered major deficiencies in the field” (Benson 1996:17).  There is 
evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Matching managerial authority with responsibility.   
 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel was unhappy with the strong practices Secretary 
McNamara exhibited.  They found that  
effective civilian control is impaired by a generally excessive centralization of 
decision-making authority at the level of the Secretary of Defense.  The 
Secretary’s ability to selectively delegate authority and decentralize management, 
while still retaining personal authority on major policy issues of the Department, 
is seriously inhibited by the present organizational structure (Report by the Blue 
Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149).   
 
The panel notes that in R&D “responsibility and management for conducting such 
research are widely fragmented among and within the Military Services and the Defense 
Agencies” (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 
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1988:213).  There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet 
this objective. 
 Promote flexibility and encourage innovation  
 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found several aspects of the Acquisition System 
that discouraged innovation.  With regards to Research and Development the Panel found  
some of the [DoD] in-house laboratories display a not-invented-here attitude that 
inhibits objective consideration of independent research and development 
products as alternatives to laboratory-originated technological approaches.  
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:213) 
 
Innovation from independent laboratories was generally discouraged.  In Advanced, 
Engineering, and Operational Systems Development the Panel found that requirements 
were received from field units then translated from broad requirements into system 
specifics by unilateral Service commands.  The options available to fulfill requirements 
are further boxed in by the practice of establishing firm-fixed contracts with firm 
schedules and costs estimates before the advance development phase.  These are 
schedules and cost estimates for the total project including production, operation, and 
maintenance.  The Panel found the “Program Managers find themselves responsible for 
administering a fixed price contract for development of a product to detailed design 
specifications on which they are permitted little flexibility for technical trade-offs”  
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:213).  The 
Panel also found that Congress’ Selected Acquisition Reports also inhibits minute 
changes in cost and schedule further confining PMs.  Any change in a SAR could subject 
the MDAP to a Congressional Review.  There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition 
Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
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 Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder.   
 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found that “no formal mechanism exists within 
OSD to assure adequate coordination among the various elements of the Department” 
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149).  The 
Panel goes on to note that routing an Acquisition Document through the hierarchy, or:  
staffing for the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Military Departments is awkward and unresponsive; it provides a 
forum for inter-Service conflicts to be injected into the decision-making process. 
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149) 
 
In order for a team to work well, information must flow freely between all levels of the 
said team.  The panel found that information does not flow freely; “differing opinions are 
submerged or compromised at lower levels of the DoD” and the large staffs employed by 
both the military and OSD delays or muddies the information received by the President 
and the Secretary of Defense (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in 
Defense Policy 1988:149).  There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight 
Process did not meet this objective. 
 Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs. 
 The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel found that oversight and review cost more then 
it should.  As the Panel explains, proposals received from contractors “may way as much 
as one ton” and the personnel required to review them team into the hundreds (Report by 
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:218).  DoD had just 
implemented the Defense System Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) to review 
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MDAPs formally more than once during its lifetime.  The Panel applauded the 
implementation of DSARC but lamented on the layers of Service headquarter 
management and Chief of Staff personnel between the PM and DSARC.   
Typically, for major weapons systems, the Program manager reports to the 
Deputy Commander for Systems Management or the procuring command, some 
five-or-six levels below that of the Secretary of the Military Service.  (Report by 
the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:226)   
 
Not mentioned are the levels of management between the Service Secretary to the 
DSARC.  The cost of staffing an item up from the PM to the DSARC is not mentioned 
but as an starting figure one can be deduced from the cost of reviewing a proposal.  The 
cost of reviewing a proposal, according to the Panel, is upwards of $100 million per 
proposal.  There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet 
this objective. 
 Emulate the best practices  
 According to the Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel, the Acquisition workforce were 
not well trained, offered few advancement opportunities, and for the most part stagnated. 
It found that  
“the promotion and rotation systems of the military Services do not facilitate 
career development in the technical and professional activities, such as research 
and development, procurement, intelligence, communications, and automatic data 
processing” (Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense 
Policy 1988:149).   
 
Further that “there is no indication of consistent efforts by the Services to select Program 
Managers from among those officers who have the most promising potential.”  Worst yet, 
the Panel found that the PM in a matrix organization had a staff that worked for them 
part-time.  “Their efficiency ratings, promotions and reporting lines are not to or through 
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the Program Manager, but rather to their superior within the functional organization” 
(Report by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as quoted in Defense Policy 1988:149).  
Those appointed above the PM were likewise ill-treated.   
 The Commission on Government Procurement also made comment on the 
workforce. 
When we undertook our studies of the procurement work force it could not be 
determined from any single source how many people are engaged in procurement, 
what skills are needed, or how they are being provided.  (Report of the 
Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:443). 
 
The Commission estimated that one fourth of said workforce were about to retire with no 
foreseeable recruitment or training of replacements.  The Commission notes that the each 
Service had some form of procurement career development and training but they “were 
not comparable either with each other or with the civilian programs” (Report of the 
Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:447).  
Such treatment of personnel is not a good practice.   
 On the issue of contractor treatment, both the Panel and the Commission agreed 
that the DoD did not use best practices of commercial firms.  Contractors were subject to 
numbers reports, scrutiny but defense agencies placed in their company, and a complex 
array of regulations and statues.  The situation discouraged rather than encourage firms to 
compete for government contracts.   
 On the issue of management, both the Panel and the Commission lamented on the 
burden of regulations and statues placed on the procurement officers or PMs.  Several of 
these regulations are noted to contradict each other (Defense Policy 1988:428-434).  
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There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this 
objective. 
 Preserve the public trust.   
 Public trust had eroded since the 1949.  As more panels, commissions, and other 
reports became public, there had been a noted lack of confidence in the oversight system.  
The Fitzhugh Blue Ribbon Panel  
“recognizes that the Department of Defense currently lacks the confidence of a 
significant segment of the American public.  While some of this is undoubtedly 
due to misunderstandings, basically the Department must work harder to do the 
jobs assigned to it as efficiently as possible and to keep the public properly 
informed.”  (Fitzhugh Commission Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel as 
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:165) 
 
Such was the degree of eroded confidence that Congress established the Commission on 
Government Procurement with Public Law 91-129.  During the hearings conducted by 
congress on this law, it was found that “Congress and the public are deeply concerned 
about the effectiveness of procurement and the manner in which it is conducted” (Report 
of the Commission on Government Procurement Vol 1 as quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:400).  There is evidence that the 1964 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet 
this objective. 
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1977 Oversight 
 
 
 The Vietnam War ended in 1974 and President Ford was elected to office.  The 
Acquisition Oversight Structure in 1977 is the end result of the implementation of 
Packard Initiatives and the DoD’s corrective actions in response to the Fitzhugh Panel 
and the Commission on Government Procurement reports. See Figure 8.   
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 Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it. 
 According to the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Controls (PPSSCC) 
Task Force on the OSD, hence forth call the Grace Commission, too many new major 
weapons systems were allowed to start thereby resulting  
in each program being given less than the required resources which, in turn, 
increases system costs and delays…the system may end up being obsolete and 
may be built in insufficient numbers to meet the mission.  (PPSSCC as quoted by 
Defense Policy 1988:797-798)  
The President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, hence forth called 
the Packard Commission, states “too many of our weapon systems cost too much, take 
too long to develop, and by the time they are fielded, incorporate obsolete technology” 
(President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:44).  There is 
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Matching managerial authority with responsibility 
 The Grace Commission found that the DoD use too many committees thereby 
defusing authority.  Also the Commission found that PMs are reluctant to accurately 
portray the status of the programs they are assigned to and “often continue until someone 
else shuts them down” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:660).  As a result, 
PMs push responsibility back up to where real authority is perceived to exist.  Higher 
managers, faced with an overwhelming burden, create committees or other management 
layer to the process thereby diffuses authority and responsibility even further.  In 
summary, the Committee found that  
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Program managers are not presently held responsible for all aspects of the 
program, since they are not able to control certain aspects, such as funding and 
program changes.  Accountability for a program is shared by a number of 
entities—the services, the program manger, the Congress and OSD.  As a result, 
no one is really held accountable.  (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:818) 
 
 The Packard Commission found that “an army of advocates for special interests 
descends on the program” to “demand that the program manager take or refrain from 
taking some action” thereby producing “a diffusion of management responsibility, in 
which everyone is responsible, and no one is responsible” (President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management 1986:44-45).  The Commission depicts the role of 
the PM as someone held responsible for the cost, schedule, or performance of the 
program but find themselves as “a supplication for, rather than a manager of, his 
program” (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:45).  
There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this 
objective. 
 Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. 
 The Grace Commission found that the DoD, by its organization and incentives to 
management, discourage change and thereby innovations.   
Few management tools are in place to make innovation automatic.  Most private 
sector companies establish guidelines to demonstrate their willingness to invest 
capital to reduce costs, improve service or increase productivity.  Instead, the 
Government sometimes sets up systems which inhibit or retard change.  (PPSSCC 
as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:664) 
 
Culturally the Government was found to avoid change or innovations.  The Commission 
found that “most Government personnel strictly adhere to the regulations, even when 
some flexibility is intended by the regulations, in order to avoid criticism” (PPSSCC as 
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quoted by Defense Policy 1988:764).  Program Managers had fallen victim to this mind 
set more often then not.  The Packard Commission found that law and regulation tend to 
make acquisition procedures even more inflexible and removes whatever motivation 
exists for the exercise of individual judgment (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management 1986:44).  There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight 
Process did not meet this objective. 
 Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder. 
 Through surveys and interviews with stakeholders, the Grace Commission has 
concluded that there is a pervasive feeling within DoD that the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) does not have the final say.  In the Commission’s estimation, “the 
military have never really bought into the need for central management by the Secretary 
of Defense” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:603).  The Commission found 
that “even after 35 years of OSD, Congress continues to deal directly with the services—
and vice versa—and frequently around OSD” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:640).  The Commission found “widespread feelings that OSD interfered with the 
service organizations by micromanaging their businesses” further that “OSD was not 
performing the function that subordinate units needed the most” (PPSSCC as quoted by 
Defense Policy 1988:657).   
 The Commission reasoned that the cause of such feelings was due to indistinct 
roles and missions performed by OSD.  The fuzzy nature of roles and missions was the 
result of two organization quirks.  First that “many staff functions which were placed in 
OSD were never completely eliminated from the staffs of the Service Secretaries” and 
second that “emphasis was on the political, the expedient, and the doable” instead of the 
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long-term mission orientation needed (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:657).  
The lack of clarity "invites and even encourages turf battles” (PPSSCC as quoted by 
Defense Policy 1988:658).   
 The Packard Commission portrays a starker environment where several special 
interest groups, including Congressional committees, fight to make their interests 
paramount and demand the PM attention.  The infighting results in gold-plating 
requirements and a high incidence of cost overruns on MDAPs; it also elongates the time 
it takes to field a system (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 
1986:46-47). There is evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet 
this objective. 
 Balance the Value of oversight and review with its cost. 
 The Grace Commission was disturbed by the hundreds of thousands of people 
needed to perform acquisition and its oversight.   
Throughout the acquisition system in DoD, there are major overlaps of functions 
in OSD and the Services which make the process of acquiring major weapons 
systems both more costly and more time consuming than necessary. (PPSSCC as 
quoted by Defense Policy 1988:647) 
 
According to the Grace Commission “there are 65,000 people in DoD who are directly 
involved in the acquisition process” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:750).  
Further, that each person also have roughly seven people supporting them.  Arguably, 
Acquisition Oversight is one of the primary duties performed by the 65,000.  The 
Packard Commission estimated the number of people closer to 145,000.  There is 
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 
 - 96 -
 
 Emulate the best practices. 
 The Grace Commission found that, unlike successful private firms, the DoD did 
not practice goal setting, did not have a method to perform self evaluations, did not 
delegate authority well and resisted change (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 
1988:660-664).  In regards to organization, the Commission found “no clear insight or 
emphasis on long-range planning” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:649).  
The Commission “believes that DoD places undue reliance on written regulations to 
accomplish the job of acquiring weapons systems.”  The Commission notes that “private 
industry has learned that spending scarce private funds is best accomplished, not by 
voluminous written regulations, buy by brief policy statements which provide guidance 
for skilled professionals” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:765).   
 The Packard Commission found six practices that DoD should emulate but don’t.  
The are as follows  
1) Clear command channels that is a short, unambiguous chain-of-command to the 
decision maker. 
 
2) Stability in performance demanded, schedule and funding. 
3) Limited reporting requirements 
4) Small, high-quality staff to manage the program rather than sell it or defend it. 
5) Greater communication with users throughout the lifecycle of the system. 
6) Greater use of prototyping and testing. 
Further the Commission found that “compared to its industry counterparts [the Defense 
Acquisition Workforce] is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced” (President’s Blue 
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Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:66).  There is evidence that the 1977 
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Preserve the public trust. 
 On this objective the Grace Commission was relatively silent.  The Commission 
found that there was a perception “that the acquisition process is largely inefficient and 
uncontrollable” (PPSSCC as quoted by Defense Policy 1988:750).  The President 
established the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard 
Commission) due to so called horror stories involving alleged fraud, waste, and abuse in 
the Acquisition Process had shaken public confidence.  To its credit the DoD had been 
forthcoming regarding these issues and public about the remedies being implemented 
(President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 1986:44).  There is 
evidence that the 1977 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
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1988 Oversight 
 
 
 President Reagan responded to the Grace Commission and Packard Commission 
by implementing a series of organizational changes.  The resulting Acquisition Oversight 
Hierarchy is depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: The Air Force Acquisition Oversight Hierarchy of 1988 
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 Help field what the Warfighter needs when he needs it. 
 Several organizations were pleased with the performance of hardware in the 
Persian Gulf War (Jones 1999:423).  A “remarkable performance and reliability of a host 
of sophisticated aerospace systems” was witnessed during this war (Benson 1996:20).  
The PAT noted that the Acquisition Oversight and Review process “is pretty good”  in 
this respect (PAT 1994:7).  There is no evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight 
Process did not meet this objective. 
 Matching managerial authority with responsibility 
 The PAT was silent on this aspect.  There is no evidence that the 1988 
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. 
 The PAT commented on the inflexibility of the reporting requirements, the 
regulations, and statues governing MDAPs.  The underlying culture of the Acquisition 
Process is such that strict adherence to these instructions are expected (PAT1994:19-21).  
There is evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this 
objective. 
 Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder. 
 The PAT identified three issues that hinder teamwork: Sub-optimization of 
functional talents, the manner staffers handle issues, and the late involvement of 
functional experts.   In OSD staffs are organized along functional veins and integrated 
groups are not formed when milestone reviews commence “as a result, each staff 
elements; oversight and review is often oriented toward achieving the best functional 
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solution instead of the best overall program solution” (PAT 1994:18).  Therefore the 
decision-maker “are left with the responsibility for integrating the information from these 
functional areas” when teamwork between functional representatives could better 
optimize the solution (PAT 1994:8).   Another hindrance to team work is the 
staffer’s tendency to reveal issues or problems to decision makers prior to making the PM 
aware of them.  Staffers should work with PMs to find solutions to issues for Decision 
Maker’s review.  The PAT teams suggests that early involvement of functional staffers to 
the program would alleviate the previous two issues.  There is evidence that the 1988 
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Balance the Value of oversight and review with its cost. 
 The PAT found that the average delay directly attributable to the Acquisition 
Oversight Process is “15 weeks beyond the scheduled 180-day Defense Acquisition 
Board process as laid out in the DoD 5000 series.  The size of the workforce employed 
for this process is assessed to bee too numerous to count.  The cost of reviews ranged 
between $10 million and $12 million.  The PAT saw these costs as excessive (PAT 
1994:7-9).  There is evidence that the 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet 
this objective.  
 Emulate the best practices. 
 Corporations perform fewer reviews then Government organizations.  “Before the 
actual milestone decision meeting, there are a series of formal and informal component 
and OSD pre-meetings” which include “functional reviews as well as broad reviews 
within the Component” (PAT 1994:37).  The PAT sees the pre-meetings as time used by 
Components “to establish their position vis-à-vis OSD” (PAT 1994:37).  It is a practice 
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that undermines teamwork and produces lengthy delays.  There is evidence that the 1988 
Acquisition Oversight Process did not meet this objective. 
 Preserve the public trust. 
 The PAT was silent on this objective.  It would appear from reviewing historian 
accounts that there is a lack of evidence that 1988 Acquisition Oversight Process did not 
meet this objective. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
 
 This chapter laid out the methodology for analysis of the various Acquisition 
Oversight Hierarchies.  Table 11 compares the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchies.  
Table 11. Acquisition Oversight Objectives
Acquisition Oversight 
Hierarchy      
  OBJECTIVES 
194
7 
196
4 
197
7 
198
8 
1
) 
Help field what the Warfighter needs when he 
needs it. + - - + 
2
) 
Matching managerial authority with 
responsibility. - - - + 
3
) 
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. - - - - 
4
) 
Foster constant teamwork.  - - - - 
5
) 
Balance the Value of oversight and review with its 
cost. - - - - 
6
) 
Emulate the best practices. - - - - 
7 Preserve the public trust. + +
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Review of Research Objectives 
 
 
 This study started out with three main objectives.  They are as follows. 
1) Define, document, and utilize available literature relevant to Acquisition 
Oversight procedures, to identify the organizations involved with the process 
as it evolved to its form today. 
 
2) Build models of the Acquisition Oversight Process, emphasis on the chain of 
command construct, as it existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 
present process. 
 
3) Evaluate each on its ability to accomplish the seven objectives identified by 
Clinton’s 1994 Process Action Team on Acquisition Oversight using past 
research relevant to Acquisition Oversight procedures. 
 
 
Discussion on Results 
 
 
 Table 11 displays the results of the qualitative analysis.  The various Commission 
Reports included evidence that the Acquisition Oversight Hierarchies of all periods did 
not meet criteria three through six signifying that more improvement in those areas can 
still be achieved.  The second through sixth criteria was more meaningful then the first or 
the seventh.  It was easy to find opinions regarding them.  One problem, there is a lack of 
evidence that the commissions held each oversight process to the same standard.  For a 
better analysis, a benchmark should be set and experts grade to that benchmark.  The first 
criteria was difficult to determine without references to wartime performance.  The 
qualitative analysis would benefit from a more thorough discovery on how weapons 
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created under a certain oversight process performed in war.  The seventh criteria was 
rarely addressed in the commission reports.  Public opinion is hard to measure or assess 
and can be easily swayed by poor information.  For future research this criterion should 
be eliminated from consideration.   
Table 11. Acquisition Oversight Objectives
Acquisition Oversight 
Hierarchy      
 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 
 
 There are four areas for future research that should be considered.  The first 
relates to the evaluation process used to compare the historical constructs.  The second 
relates to the possible quantitative comparison of the historical constructs.  The third 
relates to the preferred acquisition oversight process.  The fourth relates to sister services. 
 Now that the participants in Acquisition Oversight Process have been identified, 
the process of evaluating its performance could be enhanced.  For instance, a better scale 
  OBJECTIVES 
194
7 
196
4 
197
7 
198
8 
1
) 
Help field what the Warfighter needs when he 
needs it. + - - + 
2
) 
Matching managerial authority with 
responsibility. - - - + 
3
) 
Promote flexibility and encourage innovation. - - - - 
4
) 
Foster constant teamwork.  - - - - 
5
) 
Balance the Value of oversight and review with its 
cost. - - - - 
6
) 
Emulate the best practices. - - - - 
7 Preserve the public trust. + +
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could be developed for evaluating the constructs accomplishment of these goals.  
Different objectives could be identified for evaluation.  Another avenue would be to 
enlist the opinions of experts on these constructs and validate the models.   
 A further analysis of the cost of Acquisition Oversight could be performed.  The 
Commission reports alluded to various studies on the number of people and the time 
needed to navigate through the Acquisition Oversight Process.  Further comparisons 
using quantitative reports could reveal the true standings between each historical process.  
These numerical costs could be compared to relative benefits each construct offers.  To 
assist research in this area, data should be gathered on each MDAP going though the 
oversight processes. 
 A comparison of the models developed here could be compared to the actual track 
a program goes through using available program specific documentation.  Through this 
type of analysis it could be shown whether PMs favored the path outlined in regulations 
or if they diverted from said path.  If the results confirm widespread divergence, further 
analysis could be on why such divergence is favored.  This could lead to further 
acquisition refinements to accommodate PM choices.   
 This research centered on the Air Force Acquisition Oversight process as it 
developed through time.  A study could be commenced on Army or Navy Acquisition 
Oversight processes and a comparison made between the services.  There may be 
evidence that decentralizing the oversight process benefits society. 
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